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I. INTRODUCTION

"Freedom of the church" is in vogue these days.
A number of law and religion scholars have invoked the phrase
recently. It serves as a placeholder for the idea that freedom of religion is
not just an individual right, but also includes a group- or institutionalrights element-that the Religion Clauses guarantee not just "freedom of
religion" but also "freedom of the church."' Some of this scholarship has
drawn on the Catholic concept of "libertas ecclesiae," or "freedom of the
church," found in Vatican II's pronouncement Dignitatis Humanae.2
Other scholarship has looked further back, to the medieval era. A few
have also drawn on similar ideas in various strains of Protestantism.3
The concept arguably played an implicit but important role in the
Supreme Court's recent decision upholding the ministerial exception,
1. See, e.g., Steven D. Smith, Freedom of Religion or Freedom of the Church?,
in Legal Responses to Religious Practices in the United States: Accommodation and Its
Limits (Austin Sarat, ed., 2012) [hereinafter Smith, Freedom of the Church]; PAUL
HORWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS, ch. 7 (2013) [hereinafter HORWITZ, FIRST
AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS]; Michael W. McConnell, Reflections on Hosanna-Tabor, 35
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 821 (2012); Thomas C. Berg et al., Religious Freedom,
Church-State Separation,and the MinisterialException, 106 Nw. U.L. REV. COLLOQUY
175 (2011); Steven D. Smith, Lawyering Religious Liberty, 89 TEX. L. REV. 917 (2011)
(book review); Patrick McKinley Brennan, Are Catholics UnreliableFrom a Democratic
Point of View?: Thoughts on the Occasion of the Sixtieth Anniversary of Paul
Blanshard's American Freedom and Catholic Power, 56 VILL. L. REV. 199 (2011);
Michael J. White, The First Amendment's Religion Clauses: "Freedom of Conscience"
Versus Institutional Accommodation, 47 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 1075 (2010); E. Gregory
Wallace, Justifying Religious Freedom: The Western Tradition, 114 PENN. ST. L. REV.
485 (2009); Steven D. Smith, Discourse in the Dusk: The Twilight of Religious
Freedom?, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1869 (2009) (book review) [hereinafter Smith, Discourse];
Paul Horwitz, Churches as FirstAmendment Institutions: Of Sovereignty and Spheres,
44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 79 (2009) [hereinafter Horwitz, Sovereignty and Spheres];
Patrick McKinley Brennan, Equality, Conscience, and the Liberty of the Church:
Justifying the Controversialeper Controversialius,54 VILL. L. REV. 625 (2009); Gregory
A. Kalscheur, S.J., Civil Procedure and the Establishment Clause: Exploring the
MinisterialException, Subject-Matter Jurisdiction,and the Freedom of the Church, 17
WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 43 (2008); Richard W. Garnett, Do Churches Matter?: Towards
an Institutional Understanding of the Religion Clauses, 53 VILL. L. REv. 273 (2008);
Gerard Bradley, Pope John PaulII and Religious Liberty, 6 AVE MARIA L. REV. 33 (2007);
Richard W. Garnett, The Freedom of the Church, 4 J. CATH. Soc. THOUGHT 59 (2006).
2. Second Vatican Ecumenical Council, Dignitatis Humanae [Declaration on
Religious Freedom] (1965) [hereinafter DH], availableat http://www.vatican.va/archive/
histcouncils/iivaticancouncil/documents/vat-ii decl_19651207_dignitatis-humanaeen.
html.
3. See, e.g., John D. Inazu, The Freedom of the Church (New Revised Standard
Version), 21 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 337 (2013); Horwitz, Sovereignty and Spheres,
supra note 1; Robert Joseph Renaud & Lael Daniel Weinberger, Spheres of Sovereignty:
Church Autonomy Doctrine and the Theological Heritage of the Separation of Church
and State, 35 N. KY. L. REv. 67 (2008).
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Hosanna-TaborEvangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC. 4 Its
status as a going concern in law and religion scholarship has recently
been affirmed in the best possible way: with strong, sustained criticism
of the very concept.5 Every movement needs its doubters.
As with any emerging movement-if anything based on "freedom of
the church" can be called an "emerging" movement after more than a
millennium of existence-the terms and the stakes are not always clear.
To have a useful conversation about freedom of the church and its place
in contemporary Aiterican church-state law, we must answer two basic
questions: "what is it?" and "so what?" In this Article, I offer some
foundations for such an inquiry. I draw on two broad sources: history and
economics.
Not surprisingly, given its roots in the lengthy and often contentious
relationship between what we now call "church" and "state," freedom of
the church has already been examined in historical terms in the recent
scholarship. Those discussions often focus on a single moment: the socalled "Investiture Controversy" of the eleventh century, and particularly
132 S. Ct. 694 (2012). See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 1, at 836 ("The
4.
'freedom of the church' was the first kind of religious freedom to appear in the western
world, but got short shrift from the Court for decades. Thanks to Hosanna-Tabor,it has
once again taken center stage.").
5. See Micah Schwartzman & Richard Schragger, Against Religious Institutionalism,
99 VA. L. REv. 917 (2013). For earlier criticisms, aimed more broadly at religious group
or institutional rights rather than "freedom of the church" as such, see, e.g., Leslie C.
Griffin, The Sins of Hosanna-Tabor, 88 IND. L.J. 981 (2013), [hereinafter Griffin, Sins of
Hosanna-Tabor]; Caroline Mala Corbin, The Irony of Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran
Church & School v. EEOC, 106 Nw. U.L. REV. COLLOQUY 96 (2011); Leslie C. Griffin,
Smith and Women's Equality, 32 CARDOzO L. REv. 1831 (2011); Marie Ashe, Women's
Wrongs, Religions' Rights: Women, Free Exercise, and Establishment in American Law,
21 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 163 (2011); Leslie C. Griffin, Fightingthe New Wars
of Religion: The Need for a Tolerant First Amendment, 62 ME. L. REV. 23 (2010);
Frederick Mark Gedicks, The Recurring Paradox of Groups in the Liberal State, 2010
UTAH L. REv. 47; Marci A. Hamilton, The Waterloo for the So-Called Church
Autonomy Theory: Widespread Clergy Abuse and InstitutionalCover-Up, 29 CARDOZO
L. REv. 225 (2007); Caroline Mala Corbin, Above the Law?: The Constitutionalityof the
MinisterialExemption From AntidiscriminationLaw, 75 FORDHAM L. REv. 1965 (2007);
Marci A. Hamilton, Church Autonomy is Not a Better Path to "Truth, " 22 J.L. & RELIGION
215 (2006-2007); Gila Stopler, The Free Exercise of Discrimination:Religious Liberty,
Civic Community and Women's Equality, 10 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 459 (2004);
Marci A. Hamilton, Religious Institutions, the No-Harm Doctrine,and the Public Good,
2004 B.Y.U. L. REv. 1099; Jane Rutherford, Equality as the Primary Constitutional
Value: The Casefor Applying Employment DiscriminationLaws to Religion, 81 CORNELL L.
REV. 1049 (1996).
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the evocative image of "Emperor Henry IV, barefoot in the snow at
Canossa, begging Pope Gregory VII to grant him absolution."6 The
romantic nature of this scene lends a certain power to freedom of
the church. Like the Spanish Inquisition, the episode at Canossa would
"make[ ] a smashing film."' The "Canossa moment" reminds us of churchstate relations' long history, and cuts through the dry technicalities of
modern Religion Clause doctrine and the pristine abstractions of modern
liberal political theory. But it also gives rise to accusations of
reactionaryism and anachronism.9
A richer account of the history of freedom of church is necessary: one
that takes into account the centuries of interest-group politics and power
struggles that gave rise to freedom of the church and influenced the
course of its development. In Part II, I offer such an account.
Economics, on the other hand, has been entirely absent from recent
discussions of freedom of the church by legal scholars. This is distressing
but not surprising. Despite a burgeoning literature outside the law,' 0 the
economics of religion has played an unfortunately small role in law and
religion scholarship." Economics has a good deal to teach us about church6. Schwartzman & Schragger, supranote 5, at 933-34; see also Smith, Discourse,
supra note 1, at 1869-70; Berg et al., supra note 1, at 179 (describing Henry "plead[ing]
with the Pope for forgiveness in a blizzard at the Alpine fortress of Canossa").
7. Monty Python's Flying Circus, episode 15 (BBC Sep. 22, 1970), transcript
available at http://www.ibras.dk/montypython/episodel5.htm ("In the early years of the
sixteenth century, to combat the rising tide of religious unorthodoxy, the Pope gave
Cardinal Ximinez of Spain leave to move without let or hindrance throughout the land,
in a reign of violence, terror and torture that makes a smashing film. This was the
Spanish Inquisition .... ).
8. See Schwartzman & Schragger, supra note 5, at 938-39 (in "neo-medievalist"
accounts of freedom of the church, "it is easy to sense a form of religious nostalgia, a
certain melancholy for the passage of an age in which everyone-or at least all
Christians-shared a thick set of religious beliefs and perhaps also a way of life based on
common rituals and practices .... Maybe one day, in the distant future, we will be able
to use those relics to reestablish an order long gone.").
9. See id. at 939.
10.
For a useful recent collection, see THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS
OF RELIGION (Rachel M. McCleary ed., 2011) [hereinafter OXFORD HANDBOOK]. For a
good popularized introduction to the economics of religion, see LARRY WITHAM,
MARKETPLACE OF THE GODS: How ECONOMICS EXPLAINS RELIGION (2010). For an
excellent account of religious liberty that draws heavily on the economics of religion, see
ANTHONY GILL, THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY (2007) [hereinafter
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY].

I1. There are exceptions. See, e.g., Keith N. Hylton, Church and State: An
Economic Analysis, 13 AM. L. & ECON. REv. 402 (2011); Zoe Robinson, Rationalizing
Religious Exemptions: A Legislative Process Theory of Statutory Exemptions for
Religion, 20 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 133 (2011); Paul E. McGreal, Social Capital in
ConstitutionalLaw: The Case ofReligious Norm Enforcement Through Prayerat Public
Occasions, 40 ARIZ. ST. L. REv. 585 (2008); Jonathan Klick, Salvation as an Economic
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state relations, and law and religion more generally. It certainly has
much to offer us in any consideration of freedom of the church. I take up
that task in Part III.
I offer three prefatory points. First, my approach in this Article is
clinical. 12 I seek "neither to be cynical about religion nor to be pious
about it."' 3 I take as a given that there is value in an approach, whether
historical or economic, that "look[s] at ways in which the religion
market . . . influences individual choices as well as institutional

development,"' 4 one that involves a study of both religious institutions
themselves and the political economy of religious freedom. 5 I neither
affirm nor deny any particular religious truth claim.' 6 Nor do I assume
that religious individuals or institutions act only for worldly reasons. I
do assume that "[b]ecause religion is a set of organized beliefs, and a
church is an organized body of worshippers, it is natural to use
economics-a science that explains the behavior of individuals in

Incentive, 26 INT'L REV. L. & ECoN. 15 (2006); Shima Baradaran-Robison, Brett G.
Scharffs, & Elizabeth A. Sewell, Religious Monopolies and the Commodification of
Religion, 32 PEPP. L. REv. 885 (2005); Dennis W. Carlton & Avi Weiss, The Economics
of Religion, Jewish Survival, and Jewish Attitudes Toward Competition in Torah
Education, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 253 (2001); Elizabeth Harmer-Dionne, Once a Peculiar
People: Cognitive Dissonance and the Suppression of Mormon Polygamy as a Case
Study Negating the Belief-Action Distinction, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1295 (1998); Eric A.
Posner, The Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal and Nonlegal Sanctions on
Collective Action, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 133 (1996); Michael W. McConnell & Richard A.
Posner, An Economic Approach to Issues of Religious Freedom, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1
(1989). Some of these examples run rather far afield, however, and few of the authors
write regularly on church-state issues. On the whole, church-state legal scholars have
engaged all too little with the economics of religion.
12. Hence the title of this Article, which pays tribute to the "decidedly 'unromantic"'
public choice analysis of free speech in Daniel A. Farber, Free Speech Without
Romance: Public Choice and the FirstAmendment, 105 HARV. L. REV. 554, 579 (1991).
13. Witham, supra note 10, at vii.
14. Rachel M. McCleary, The Economics of Religion as a Field of Inquiry, in
OXFORD HANDBOOK, supra note 10, at 3, 8.
15. For the latter, see, e.g., Religious Liberty, supra note 10; Anthony Gill, Religion
and Civil Liberties in the United States, in OXFORD HANDBOOK, supra note 10, at 275,
277 (discussing "religious liberty as a regulatory issue") [hereinafter Gill, Religion and
Civil Liberties]; ANTHONY GILL, RENDERING UNTO CAESAR: THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AND
THE STATE IN LATIN AMERICA (1998).
16. This is consistent with my approach in PAUL HORWITZ, THE AGNOSTIC AGE:
LAW, RELIGION, AND THE CONSTITUTION (2011).
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organizations-to understand the development of organized religion."17
Similarly, in examining religious freedom in general and "freedom of the
church" in particular, I assume that it is useful to examine "the political and
economic interests of politicians (rulers) and the institutional interests of
religious leaders in the policy-making arena."18
Second, my goals in this piece are mostly descriptive, not normative. I
have championed freedom of the church and/or an institutional approach
to religious freedom in the past.19 I am not currently tempted to retreat
significantly from those views.20 But neither am I wholly satisfied with
the current accounts and defenses of freedom of the church or church
autonomy. There is surely a place for a certain degree of romance, or a
somewhat nostalgic retrieval of ancient ideas and historical moments, as
an inspiration for those who seek an alternative to the current
understanding of church-state law and relations. 2 1 But there is also a
place for more dry-eyed realism about freedom of the church, and for a
more careful evaluation of the concept and its history. This kind of
analysis of freedom of the church should come from its advocates, not
just its critics.
Finally, this Article focuses substantially on Roman Catholic history
and thought. There are obvious reasons for this choice. The concept of
freedom of the church comes from Catholic history, and the Catholic
Church's long institutional history makes it an exemplary subject of
economic analysis.22 That focus involves two risks. First, given the
unromantic bent of this Article, it may seem to reserve all its barbs for
Catholicism; of course, there is no hostile intent in my focus on a single
church.23 Second, it mostly leaves out significant developments in
17. ROBERT B. EKELUND JR., ROBERT F. HtBERT, & ROBERT D. TOLLISON, THE
MARKETPLACE OF CHRISTIANITY vii (2006) [hereinafter EKELUND, HEBERT, & TOLLISON,
MARKETPLACE].
18. Gill, supra note 10, at 7-8.
19. See my book and article cited at note 1; see also Paul Horwitz, Defending
(Religious) Institutionalism,99 VA. L. REV. 1049 (2013) [hereinafter Horwitz, Defending
(Religious) Institutionalism];Paul Horwitz, Act III of the MinisterialException, 106 Nw.
U. L. REV. 973 (2012) [hereinafter Horwitz, Act IIl].
20. But see Horwitz, Defending (Religious) Institutionalism, supra note 19, at
1054-55 (agreeing that religious institutionalists, and First Amendment institutionalists
more generally, should be cautious about using sovereignty as a guiding concept or metaphor
in their work).
21.
See, e.g., Frederick Mark Gedicks, True Lies: Canossa as Myth, 21 J. CONTEMP.
LEGALISSUES 133 (2013).
22. See EAMON DUFFY, SAINTS & SINNERS: A HISTORY OF THE POPES xi (3d ed.
2006).
23.
Witham, supra note 10, and Oxford Handbook, supra note 10, both offer many
examples of other faiths that can be seen as acting in terms of institutional interests, rentseeking, and so on.
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Protestant history and thought, which also involve versions of freedom

of the church.2 4 I address some of those matters in Part III, but I
acknowledge the gap that remains.
In Part IV I draw some tentative conclusions about freedom of the
church in light of the historical and economic analysis that I provide
here. If there is a broad theme here, it is one of declension or chastening. 25
My point is more descriptive than normative, although it may carry some
normative implications. I mean nothing more-or less-than that the
idea of freedom of the church has undergone a "scaling-back," a
"chastening of [ ] aspiration." 2 6 Despite some of the grand talk that has
accompanied the revival of interest in freedom of the church, the modem
version of "freedom of the church" is a shadow of its former self. It is a
concept with dramatically diminished aspirations. What began as a
struggle for the soul of the Church and the ordering of Western society
has mostly ended as a fight for exemptions from employment
discrimination laws and mandatory insurance coverage provisions.
The "what is it?" and "so what?" questions with which we began the
discussion thus turn out to be closely related. What freedom of the
church "is" today, or is likely to be, turns out to be not such a big deal,
for better or worse. It still has practical value, in my view.2 7 It still speaks,
in broader terms, to important conclusions about the nature and limits of
the state and the importance of mediating institutions.28 But, under present

24. See generally Inazu, supra note 3. Indeed, most of the Supreme Court cases
dealing with church autonomy involve non-Catholic churches. For an overview, see, e.g.,
Christopher C. Lund, In Defense of the MinisterialException, 90 N.C. L. REv. 1 (2011).
25. Not for the first time, apparently. See Robert Post, Understanding the First
Amendment, 87 WASH. L. REV. 549, 554 (2012) (describing my article in the same issue,
Paul Horwitz, The FirstAmendment's Epistemological Problem, 87 WASH. L. REv. 445
(2012), as "advanc[ing] a melancholy narrative of declension"). As the saying goes,
write what you know.
26. Mark Tushnet, Foreword: The New ConstitutionalOrder and the Chastening
of ConstitutionalAspiration, 113 HARV. L. REv. 29, 107, 108 (1999); see also id. at 109
("A nation-state whose sovereignty has diminished must have chastened constitutional
aspirations, and properly so"-a statement that, we will see, can be applied to the Church
as well).
27.
See infra Part IV (arguing that religion's "credence good" nature supplies
arguments for a ministerial exception).
28. See, e.g., Horwitz, Defending (Religious) Institutionalism, supra note 19;
HORWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS, supra note 1, ch. 7; Horwitz, Act III of the
MinisterialException, supra note 19; Horwitz, Sovereignty and Spheres, supra note 1.
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conditions of American religious pluralism, it is not what it was. In that
environment, it is both less dangerous and less substantial.
Both the defenders and the critics of freedom of the church's revival
seem to take as their text Santayana's observation that those who do not
remember the past will be condemned to repeat its mistakes.2 9 In this
case, however, Marx was closer to the mark: "[A]ll facts ... of great
importance in world history occur, as it were, twice[:] ... the first time
as history, the second as farce."3 o If that is a little too harsh, it is still an
apt description of the fact that freedom of the church is now on the upswing
precisely because it has already fallen so far and been so thoroughly
domesticated.
II. FREEDOM OF THE CHURCH IN HISTORY
Our first question is what, precisely, is meant by the phrase "freedom
of the church." A recurring trope in discussions of freedom of the church
is that it is, at least in some measure, a historically transcendent concept.
The principles it contains are said to be "absolute and immutable and
supra-temporal." 3 1 "The same idea" is seen as a singular motivating force in
events separated by some 14 centuries. 32
I reserve judgment on whether that is true as a metaphysical matter.
As a historical matter, however, it is false. "Freedom of the church" has
had a wide range of meanings and implications. As such, it is no more
helpful in understanding religious freedom and church-state relations
than other abstractions, such as "liberty" or "equality." Whether the label
captures any "general immutable principles" or not, what matters for most
purposes is the way "freedom of the church" has been applied within "the
specific patterns of civilization, the intelligible features . . . peculiar to

every given historical age." 3

29. See GEORGE SANTAYANA, THE LIFE OF REASON 284 (1936) ("Those who
cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.")
30.

KARL MARX, THE EIGHTEENTH BRUMAIRE OF Louis BONAPARTE 15 (Int'l

Publishers 1991).
JACQUES MARITAIN, MAN AND THE STATE 157 (1951).
31.
See, e.g., JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, S.J., WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS: CATHOLIC
32.
REFLECTIONS ON THE AMERICAN PROPOSITION 201-02 (1960).

33. MARITAIN, supra note 31, at 157; see also id at 179-80 ("[W]hat matters
essentially to me is the fact that the supreme general principles are immutable; and that
the ways of applying or realizing them are analogical, and change according to the
variety of historical climates. So the principles which were applied in a given way by the
sacral civilization of the Middle Ages always hold true, but they are to be applied in
another way in modem secular civilization.").
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A. Freedom of the Church Circa 494 A.D.
It is appropriate to begin well before Canossa, with the enunciation of

a position on church-state relations that would recur frequently throughout
the medieval debates on freedom of the church.34 It arose from the simple
fact of Christianity having become an imperial religion, under the protection
of the emperors but also, in large measure, under their command.35 In
494, Pope Gelasius I wrote to the emperor, Anastasius, arguing:
Two there are, august emperor, by which this world is chiefly ruled, the sacred
authority of the priesthood and the royal power. Of these the responsibility of
the priests is more weighty in so far as they will answer for the kings of men
themselves at the divine judgement. . . . [I]n the order of religion, in matters
concerning the reception and right administration of the heavenly sacraments,
you ought to submit yourself rather than rule, and [ ] in these matters you should
depend on [the priesthood's] judgement rather than seek to bend them to your
will. For if the bishops themselves, recognizing that the imperial office was
conferred on you by divine disposition, obey your laws so far as the sphere of
public order is concerned lest they seem to obstruct your decrees in mundane
matters, with what zeal, I ask you, ought you to obey those who have been
charged with administering the sacred mysteries? 36

Many conventional accounts of freedom of the church, especially in
the recent legal literature, draw a straight line from Gelasius to the
Investiture Controversy and beyond. Thus, Michael McConnell writes,
"After the collapse of Imperial Rome, from at least the time of Pope
Gelasius, standard legal thinking in Western Europe was based on the
theory of the Two Kingdoms-the idea that God created two different
forms of authority, two swords that were clearly distinguished: spiritual
and temporal, sacred and secular, church and state."37 Similarly, citing
Gelasius, Richard Garnett writes that "the observation at the heart of the
libertas ecclesiae principle-i.e., that there are two, not one-preceded
[Gregory VII] by many centuries." 38

34. See BRIAN TIERNEY, THE CRISIS OF CHURCH AND STATE 1050-1300 10 (reprint
1988) (1964).
35. See id. at 8-9.
36. Id. at 13-14.
37. Michael W. McConnell, Non-State Governance,2010 UTAH L. REv. 7, 8.
38. Garnett, Freedom of the Church, supra note 1, at 67.
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Gelasius' letter was cited frequently in the propaganda war that
accompanied the Investiture Controversy.3 9 But its relationship to the
later debate is controversial at best. On one reading, Gelasius' careful
use of different terms to describe papal and imperial power-auctoritas
for the papacy, and potestas for the emperor-signaled that the secular
power was to be subordinate to that of the Church. 4 0 But that reading is
open to debate. Other scholars have argued that this interpretation
"places more weight on Gelasius' words than they can bear," and that
Gelasius' aim was simply "to protect the doctrinal independence of the
church and the judicial freedom of the clergy."" Elsewhere, Gelasius
made clear that neither the secular nor the spiritual power ought to be
subordinate to the other: that the "'soldier of God' would not be involved in
secular affairs, while on the other hand he who was involved in secular
affairs would not seem to preside over divine matters."42
Gelasius, in short, appeared to argue for a dualist approach to churchstate relations. On that view, "temporal and spiritual power existed in
parallel within their own spheres," and the Pope could no more interfere
with secular matters than the emperor with spiritual ones.43 Moreover,
this view made clear that the power of kingship was as divinely ordained
as the power of religious leadership. Gelasius' version of "freedom of
the church" represented a sensible position for the Church, one that was
assertive but basically defensive. Like all influential textual authorities,
however, its meaning and implications would be vigorously contested
over time.
B. Freedom of the Church Circa 1075
It is impossible to do justice to the many changes that occurred in the
period leading up to the Investiture Controversy, but some of them merit
discussion here. First, for most of this period the divine nature of
kingship, for the emperor if not all rulers, was widely accepted." Kings
were not simply a part of what would eventually become the laity; they
were "sacral figures," whose power derived from both spiritual and

39. See, e.g., HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE
WESTERN LEGAL TRADION 94 (1983); GERD TELLENBACH, CHURCH, STATE AND CHRISTIAN
SOCIETY AT THE TIME OF THE INVESTITURE CONTEST 115 (R.F. Bennett trans., 1940).
40.
See, e.g., WALTER ULLMAN, A SHORT HISTORY OF THE PAPACY IN THE MIDDLE
AGES 32-35 (2d ed. 2003).
41.

37 (2d ed.
42.
43.
44.

68

JOSEPH CANNING, A HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL POLITICAL THOUGHT 300-1450 36,

2005) (1996).
TIERNEY, supra note 34, at 14-15 (quoting Gelasius).
CANNING, supra note 41, at 92, 94.
See TELLENBACH, supra note 39, at 90.
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temporal sources. 4 5 The papal coronation of Charlemagne as emperor in
800, which was both a politically necessary alliance and perhaps an attempt
to assert the Pope's right to "delegate imperial authority in the West to
whom he would,A 6 left the emperors in a strong position to wield power
over not only church appointments, but even matters of religious doctrine.47
Second, the clergy served as part of those kings' governing apparatus.
That -meant not only that they could significantly influence secular matters,
but also that the Church itself accrued expertise and experience in the art
of government. 4 8 This development would contribute significantly to its
emergence as a central institution in western European history.
Third, the Church depended on secular rulers for land and income. It
thus accepted, whether grudgingly or willingly, a subordinate relationship to
secular power as a result. Under the prevailing proprietary church
system, "the owner of the land had a right to erect a church on his land
which[,] because it remained his property[,] was provided by him with a
cleric whom he simply appointed to it. The clerics thus appointed came
under the jurisdiction of the lay lord." 4 9 The same was true at higher
levels of the church hierarchy as well. "In effect," Walter Ullmann writes,
"every important see, church or abbey, had by the tenth century become
dependent upon the monarchy."so The outward sign of this relationship, and
the immediate symbol of the contest between church and state in the
eleventh century, was the participation by the lay ruler in the ceremony
investing the new ecclesiastical official, generally selected by that ruler,
with the ring and staff of office. In short, the clergy enjoyed both land
and office as much through secular as ecclesiastical means, "and the
ruler understandably felt that he had rights.
The conventional story of freedom of the church told by most legal
scholars tends to offer too light a gloss on this fact. The causes and
consequences of the proprietary church system are essential to the struggle
that followed. To say that the proprietary system was an artifact of
feudalism is true but too limited. The feudal system itself was an artifact45. BERMAN, supra note 39, at 88; see also R.W. SOUTHERN, WESTERN SOCIETY
AND THE CHURCH IN THE MIDDLE AGES 32 (1970).
46. SOUTHERN, supra note 45, at 99.
47.
See, e.g., F. DONALD LOGAN, A HISTORY OF THE CHURCH IN THE MIDDLE AGES
69-72 (2d ed. 2013).
48.
49.

See, e.g., TELLENBACH, supra note 39, at 69; ULLMANN, supra note 40, at 116.
ULLMANN, supra note 40, at 99.

50.

Id. at 116.

51.

LOGAN, supra note 47, at 105.
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in this case, of insecurity. This was a period in which Western Europe
was under attack by the expanding Muslim empire, the Vikings, and the
Magyars. The job of protection fell to local lords, and with that protection
came feudal bonds of duty, or vassalage. The Church, like other
communities and institutions, thus fell substantially under the control of
"lay lords." 52
Given this state of affairs, church lands and offices became commodities
to be bought and sold. In those circumstances, there was no guarantee
that the prize would go to the most pious. So the church became rife with
questionable local practices, including the abandonment of "the old ascetic
discipline of the Western church," such as clerical celibacy.
The Church's initial response was not to seek absolute independence,
but to turn to the kings themselves for support,54 blessing this arrangement
by arguing that "[k]ingship was itself a sacred office." 5 This certainly
benefited the king, who could maintain greater control over the church
territories in his command and the people appointed to run them than he
could over lands held by lesser nobles, which were subject to hereditary
succession.
Although the proprietary church system placed a good deal of authority
over the Church in the hands of secular powers, in the long run it also
benefited the Church. By the eleventh century, many of these lands were
owned by church bodies. Moreover, in some cases, most famously the
establishment of the monastery at Cluny and its daughter houses, the
proprietary system, when generously exercised by patrons, helped create
and sustain a monastic movement that would ultimately launch the eleventh
century push for church reform.57
The church reform movement and its leaders bring us to the Investiture
Controversy and the scene at Canossa. The conventional story is typically
given in broad, bold strokes. Although sometimes acknowledging that

52.

TIERNEY, supra note 34, at 24.

53. Id.
54. See id. at 25 ("In such circumstances pious churchmen throughout Europe
turned to their kings for leadership and protection. It seemed to them that the only hope
for the maintenance of any orderly Christian life lay in the emergence of strong
monarchs who would maintain an elementary degree of peace and justice in their
lands.").
55. Id.
56.
57.

See TELLENBACH, supra note 39, at 117.
See TIERNEY, supra note 34, at 26, 28-29; see generally KATHLEEN G. CUSHING,

REFORM AND THE PAPACY IN THE ELEVENTH CENTURY: SPIRITUALITY AND SOCIAL CHANGE

(2005).
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the controversy was complex and resulted in no clear winner or loser,
the narrative still ends up portraying a struggle between two clear
contending sides-church and state-over the simple, attractive idea that
"'royal jurisdiction was not unlimited."' 5 9 The "whole point of the great
conflict," it is said, concerned state assertions of authority over "religious
entities' training, selection, and dismissal of clergy."60 More than this
needs to be said to understand the controversy properly, however.
To be sure, the Investiture Controversy, and the other reforms that
made up the Gregorian movement, had their roots at least as much in
spiritual matters as in temporal ones. The movement began flowering
under Pope Leo IX-himself, ironically, the chosen appointee of King
Henry III of Germany. Leo gathered together a number of talented figures,
mostly from the monastic communities, to press for reform on the issues
"considered to be the most besetting sins of the church: simony and
clerical marriage or concubinage."6 1 Whether lay investiture was always
and everywhere wrong as a form of simony, what this meant for the validity
of priestly functions performed by those who had obtained their offices
through simony, and whether kings retained some legitimate role in
appointing or approving clergy-all these were contested issues, debated by
the central intellectual figures of the reform movement, Cardinal Peter
Damiani and Cardinal Humbert of Silva Candida.62
Thus, the Investiture Controversy was not simply a power play by the
Church. Nor was it simply a power play by the state. The royalists'
58. See, e.g., Thomas C. Berg et al., Religious Freedom, Church-StateSeparation,
and the MinisterialException, 106 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 175, 180 (2011); Smith,
Discourse,supra note 1, at 1870.
Some of the writers who I suggest here have been too broad in their discussions of the
Investiture Controversy and freedom of the church have suggested, on reading earlier
drafts of this Article, that my criticism is itself too broad; that they offer considerably
more nuance than I give them credit for. I am ultimately content to let readers judge for
themselves. I do believe those accounts, while providing suitable caveats, tend to be too
sweeping or romantic. But they do offer caveats, and I would be remiss if I did not add
that I am grateful to them for introducing me to the history of freedom of the church in
the first place.
59. Richard W. Garnett, Religion and Group Rights: Are Churches (Just) Like the
Boy Scouts?, 22 ST. JOHN'S. J. LEGAL COMMENT. 515, 524 (2007) (quoting BERMAN,
supranote 39, at 269).
60. Richard W. Garnett, Church, State, and the PracticeofLove, 52 VILL. L. REV.
281, 300 (2007).
61.
TIERNEY, supranote 34, at 27. Clerical marriage was also known as "nicolaitism."
62.
See id. at 33-44; NORMAN F. CANTOR, THE CIVILIZATION OF THE MIDDLE AGES
250-56 (1993).
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justifications for lay investiture were equally theological in nature, and
drew on equally ancient sources and customs. 63
But it was, inevitably, also a power play, involving changing material
conditions, competing ambitions, multiple contending forces, and strategic
as well as intellectual considerations. Among the relevant factors here
were the relative freedom of Western Europe from outside attack, which
gave the contending forces within Western Europe breathing space for
their mutual struggle; increasing economic development in the region;
the youth of King Henry IV, whose minority status gave the Church room
to press its causes without immediate political pushback; and the presence
of multiple contending interest groups, each with its own resources and
weapons. This included the troubled but useful alliance forged between
the papacy and the Normans. The Normans had only recently broken the
papacy of Leo IX and held him captive. But they soon negotiated with
Pope Nicholas II to provide the Church with military support in exchange
for the legitimization of Norman holdings in southern Italy. 4
The intellectual and spiritual aspect of this power struggle was equally
important, and not just because it was here that "freedom of the church"
became the "battle cry" 65 of the Gregorian reformers-especially the
leading figure, Pope Gregory VII, formerly the monk Hildebrand. The
positions that Gregory pushed so fiercely have several noteworthy aspects.
The Pope "was deeply preoccupied with moral reform" of the Church,
"and sometimes seems to have set this objective above all others."66 He
sought to arrest the moral corruption of the Church, and specificallyand this represents a change in medieval thinking-that of the clergy, the
preservation of whose distinct status from the laity became increasingly
important to the reformers. To the extent that lay investiture, combined
with the proprietary church system, led to the selection of inadequate clergy,
and their neglect of spiritual matters in favor of temporal ones and personal
ambitions, Gregory's opposition to it can be seen as part and parcel of
the project of internal Church reform, not just as a church-state power
struggle.
But things are not quite so simple as that. Whatever texts the ostensibly
doctrinally conservative Gregory VII may have cited in favor of his

63.
64.
65.

See, e.g., TIERNEY, supra note 34, at 74-84.
See id. at 28, 36, 44.
Brian Tierney, Religious Rights: An HistoricalPerspective, in RELIGIOUS HUMAN

RIGHTS INGLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: RELIGIOUS PERSPECTIVES 17, 23 (John Witte, Jr. & Johan D.

van der Vyver eds., 1996).
66. Tierney, supra note 34, at 47.
See CANTOR, supra note 62, at 246-47.
67.
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reform program,

what was at stake in the dispute was not simply an

argument for a return to the kind of Gelasian church-state dualism that is

the focus of modem champions of freedom of the church. To the contrary,
both with respect to "internal" church reform and "external" church-state
relations, Gregory's program was a hierocratic one. It described a "model of
papal monarchy" based on a single community of Christianitas,in which
the Pope is the head of the church, "the clergy are superior to the laity[,]
and spiritual jurisdiction is superior to temporal." In particular, the
latter two claims applied as clearly to kings and emperors as to lesser lords
or laity, placing all of the regium under the control of the sacerdotiumand all of the sacerdotium under the control of the Pope. Only the most
vague or delicate description could ignore the fact that the Gregorian
reform and the Investiture Controversy were not about "two swords"
wielded by two distinct powers, each with distinct jurisdictions, but about
two swords ultimately wielded by one man.
All this .is apparent in the Dictatus Papae, the list of propositions
propounded by Gregory VII in 1075.70 Demonstrating the point that the
Gregorian revolution was as much about Church reform and the
consolidation of papal control as it was about church-state relations,
most of the propositions put forward by Gregory dealt only with
ecclesiastical matters.7 1 For example, the Dictatus Papae asserted, often
in the teeth of the custom and practice of the time, that the Pope alone
could "depose or reinstate bishops," that papal legates "take[ ] precedence []
in a council of all bishops and may render a sentence of deposition against
them," that the Pope could "be judged by no one,"7 2 and that "the Roman
Pontiff . .. is undoubtedly sanctified by the merits of St. Peter." Equally

important was its assertion that "no one shall dare to condemn a person
who appeals to the Apostolic see."7 This assertion helped maintain direct
appeals to the papacy over other dispute resolution mechanisms, reinforcing
the system of papal adjudication that would play a major role in making
the Church a quasi-state over the following centuries.

68.
Joseph Canning aptly calls Gregory VII an "archetypal conservative
revolutionary." CANNING, supra note 41, at 97.
69. CANNING, supra note 41, at 94.
70. See Tierney, supra note 34, at 49; id. at 46.
71.
See CANNING, supra note 41, at 88.
72.
Tierney, supra note 34, at 49-50.
73. Id. at 50.
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But the Dictatus Papae reached beyond internal Church reform itself.
It sought to redefine the relationship between the Church and the secular
powers. It made clear that the Pope could depose emperors, not just
excommunicate them, as earlier popes had done; that he alone could use
the imperial insignia, thus emphasizing an "imperial papacy" with "the
attributes and trappings of secular power";7 4 and that he could release
kingly subjects from their oaths of fidelity to their rulers.
These theological positions inevitably intersected with conditions on
the ground. They implicated not just the relationship between "Church"
and "State," but the relationship between the Pope and bishops, between
emperors or kings and their lay lords, between rulers and their own
military resources, between the Church as a political institution and its
political allies, and so on. At the risk of anachronism or faulty labeling,
just as the dispute was not only a "secular" power struggle, neither was
it just about "pure" theology as we would understand it today. It was
theology as power play; it involved the theology of power; and it was a
power play with theology as the strategic battleground.
All this helps us understand a little better what Gregory VII meant
when he made "libertas ecclesiae," or "freedom of the church," his rallying
cry. The phrase signified neither a withdrawal of the Church from the
secular world, with a concomitant protection from the depredations of that
world, nor a Gelasian vision of a limited but protected church in a dualist
order. It signified, rather, the freedom of the church to do what it must.
Because Gregory and other reformers took a broad view of the spiritual
obligations and authority of the Church in the world,n that meant in effect
"[bringing] the world unreservedly into the sphere of the Church." 78
With respect to papal authority both within the Church and beyond it,
in short, this was a hierocratic vision of power through and through. It
was a bid for dominance, not separation. And it was as worldly as it was

74.

CANNING, supra note 41, at 89.

75. See id. at 88-89; Tierney, supra note 34, at 49-50; see also LOGAN, supra note 47,
at 99 ("Gregory VII used the reforming movement as a means of enhancing papal power,
or, to put it another way, he considered reform to include the enhancement of papal
power.").
76. But see NORMAN DAVIES, EUROPE: A HISTORY 339 (1993) ("[D]espite the
high-flown legal and theological language in which it was conducted, the investiture
contest was a straightforward struggle for power. Was the emperor to control the pope,
or the pope to control the emperor?").
77. See, e.g., CANTOR, supra note 62, at 249.
78. TELLENBACH, supra note 39, at 154; see id. at 158 ("In reality [Gregory]
excluded nothing from the purview of the Church. The old theory of the two powers
which should bear rule in the world consequently lost its meaning for him and his
supporters.... [T]he point to which importance was now attached was the superiority of
the one [power] over the other.").
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spiritual or conceptual. For Gregory, Gerd Tellenbach writes, "the
metaphysical precedence which, in the eyes of the spiritual leaders of the
Church, the priestly authority had always possessed over the royal, had
logically to be converted into a complete supremacy." 7 9 If the Church
was to advance its mission in the world, it must perforce expand its power
to the utmost extent.8 Libertas ecclesiae entailed far more, in terms of
both church power and church supremacy, in this period than it wouldor could-later.8 1
The dramatic climax of the Investiture Controversy has been presented
often enough in recent American church-state literature to be generally
familiar.82 In a contest over the appointment of the bishop of Milan,
Gregory and King Henry IV of Germany reached an impasse. Following
Henry's denunciation of Gregory, the pope not only excommunicated him,
in February 1076, but stripped him of royal authority as well, "releas[ing]
all Christian men from the allegiance which they have sworn or may
swear to him" and "forbid[ding] anyone to serve him as king." 8 3 Henry,
"excommunicated and hence politically crippled," begged the pope's
forgiveness in the snow at Canossa.84 Once absolved, although not restored
to his kingship, Henry was able to collect his forces. Though he was
excommunicated a second time, he and his forces "marched on Rome to
expel Gregory and install his own pope there."85 Gregory ended up driven
away from Rome, expiring with the words, "I have loved justice and
hated iniquity-and so I die in exile."86 The investiture struggle raged on
without him, but the spark of libertasecclesiae had been lit.

79.
80.
81.

Id. at 158.
See id. at 156.
Compare John Witte, Jr., Introduction, in CHRISTIANITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS:
AN INTRODUCTION 8, 20-21 (John Witte, Jr. & Frank S. Alexander eds., 2010) (offering
a description of the breadth of the Gregorian version of libertas ecclesiae), with Richard
W. Garnett, Religious Liberty, Church Autonomy, and the Structure ofFreedom, in id. at
267, 269, 272, 274 (offering a description of the post-Vatican II version of libertasecclesiae).
82. See, e.g., Garnett, supra note 1, at 66; Smith, Freedom of the Church, supra
note 1, at 266. For a brief narrative and documentary record, see Tierney, supra note 34,
at 53-73.
83.
Tiemey, supra note 34, at 61 (quoting the pope's deposition of the king).
84. Smith, Freedom of the Church, supra note 1, at 266.
85. Tierney, supra note 34, at 55.
86. Id.
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Nothing in that narrative is untrue, and those who recount it note
responsibly that there is "a great deal more to the story."87 But this version
still seems to place too much weight on the notion that the contest
involved political weapons wielded against spiritual ones, excommunication
versus military power. In fact, both sides wielded both sorts of weapons.
The king and his allies made their own theological arguments. 8
Excommunication itself was as much a political as a religious weapon.
And on both sides there was a tangle of political alliances and power
relations.
It is true that excommunication was a powerful tool. But it is not the
whole truth. Many German ecclesiastics feared allying themselves too
much with Henry in case he should lose. Given the interconnectedness
of land-including church lands-and power at the time, their hesitation
effectively deprived the king of a good deal of his military power.89 The
German nobility, which had its own sources of power and revenue and
chafed at the king's command, "exulted in this unexpected [positive]
reversal of their fortunes" and took full advantage of it. 90 In the short term,
at least, "the centrifugal forces of the feudal order worked to the Pope's
advantage." 91
In the medium term, however, political forces shifted. Gregory's
insistence on traveling to Germany to arbitrate between Henry and his
princes, and the attendant travel delays, gave his wavering supporters
reason to believe that he had become "irresolute[e]" in his position.9 2
Moreover, Gregory's stand against Henry raised the ire of the Roman
nobility, who resented the dangers to which he had exposed the city and
who themselves ultimately invited Henry and his newly appointed antipope, Clement III, into Rome. Thirteen of Gregory's own cardinals
defected. And Gregory's last resort, his own military alliances, proved
his undoing. Although his Norman allies came to his defense, they also
sacked the city, ultimately leading the Romans to cast out pope and
Normans alike. 94
The point of this extended description of events is not to undercut the
importance of the controversy or its broader implications by reducing it
87. Garnett, supra note 1, at 68. Garnett is referring here not only to the controversy
and its immediate aftermath, but to the wider sweep of historical struggle over the
freedom of the church.
88. See, e.g., Tierney, supra note 34, at 74-84; CANNING, supra note 41, at 99.
89. See CANTOR, supra note 62, at 269.
90. Id.
91. DAVIES, supra note 76, at 342.
92. ULLMANN, supra note 40, at 159.
93. See id. at 160-61.
94. See id. at 161.
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to a more vulgar version of reality, although a little more vulgarity may
be appropriate. Rather, it suggests that the more details are added to the
story, the more complex, multivariant, and contingent the whole affair
becomes. One of the standard morals of the contemporary telling of the
Canossa story is that we modems must appreciate that church and state
were not truly separate in that era-that the whole of medieval life was
suffused with religion.95 But the converse point is equally true. It is just
as accurate to say that the medieval Church, as one of the principal
institutions of the era, was inseparable from worldly politics. As R.W.
Southern writes: "When historians write of the church as if it could be
separated from secular history, they are simply repeating the mistake made
by medieval ecclesiastical reformers, who were never more clearly the
captives of their environment than when they spoke of their freedom
from it." 96
In sum, whatever we conclude about the underlying correctness of either
Gregory or Henry's positions on investiture and church-state relations,
we must at least agree that those positions worked themselves out as
much politically as spiritually or intellectually. They were deeply entangled
in the resources and institutions of the time, from feudalism to the weak
state to the political and geographical divisions within the Church itself.
They were thus deeply contingent, changing according to context just as
they ultimately worked a great change in the Western context.
The immediate outcome of the Investiture Controversy, after some
thirty years of conflict, was the Concordat of Worms in 1122. As others
have noted, an interesting preface to that development was the proposal
by Pope Paschal II to disclaim the Church's worldly positions, lands,
and revenues and live by voluntary donations, in exchange for the royal
surrender of any role in investiture. On Paschal's view, the Church was

95.
See, e.g., Smith, Freedom of the Church, supra note 1, at 267-68. But see, R.
Martin Goodridge, The Ages ofFaith: Romance or Reality?, 23 SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 394
(1975); Witham, supra note 10, at 152-53; RODNEY STARK & ROGER FINKE, ACTS OF
FAITH: EXPLAINING THE HUMAN SIDE OF RELIGION 63-68 (2000) ("[L]ike so many onceupon-a-time tales, this conception of a pious past is mere nostalgia; most prominent
historians of medieval religion now agree that there never was an 'Age of Faith').
96. SOUTHERN, supra note 45, at 15-16.
97.
See, e.g., ULLMANN, supra note 40, at 168-69. CANNING, supra note 41, at
107, offers a different interpretation of events: "This initiative was not, as was once
thought, the product of a desire to achieve apostolic poverty, but an attempt to remove
the root reason for royal investiture in order to free the church from lay control: Paschal
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superior to lay authorities, but its authority "had to be based on a real
repudiation of the worldly power and wealth that secular princes had
sought for themselves." 98 The proposal was shouted down.99
Surely one reason that Paschal's radical proposal failed was a worldly
concern on the part of the bishops, who "wanted the pope to help them
defend their ancient rights [and holdings], not to act as a broker in
relinquishing them."100 In that telling, the rejection of Paschal's proposal
represents an intriguing missed opportunity, in which Paschal fell victim
to tenacious "vested interests" within the Church. 10 ' But if there were
political motives in the priestly opposition to the proposal, there were
equally political motives on the part of the secular princes, who also
rejected it, fearing that the transfer of church power would dramatically
enhance the power of the king.1 02 Again, the proposal and its failure were
both spiritual and political, and must be viewed through both lenses.
Paschal's abortive proposal also illustrates how variable the concept of
libertas ecclesiae and its implications could be, even within a relatively
narrow, albeit unsettled, period of time.'0 3 Paschal was a Gregorian
reformer and a believer in the superiority of the Church. But his
understanding of freedom of the church and what it entailed "was one
which Gregory VII had never dreamed of and which he certainly would
have viewed with dismay."l 04 For Paschal, freedom of the church meant
renunciation as well as autonomy; for Gregory, "the greater the material
wealth and power of the church, the better; and if the argument was
pressed to the point where temporal kings became mere agents of the pope,
there were some who would find the conclusion palatable enough."'
Ultimately, the Concordat of Worms involved a different compromise,
and "[t]here was no winner .. .just as there was no right party and no wrong
party."' 06 The German contest was resolved by allowing bishops to be
elected by the Church and ending the imperial practice of investing new
bishops with ring and staff. On the other hand, the king "was permitted
to be present at the election and to receive homage from newly elected
intended that the church should retain all its possessions (ecclesiastica) which were not
regalia,together with the patrimony of St. Peter."
98. Tierney, supra note 34, at 87.
99. See ULLMANN, supra note 40, at 169.
100.
SOUTHERN, supra note 45, at 189.
101.
LOGAN, supra note 47, at 107.
102.
See ULLMANN, supra note 40, at 169.
103.
Cf BERMAN, supra note 39, at 105 (noting that the changing meaning of
freedom of the church between 1075 and 1122 "was one of the marks of the revolutionary
character of the times").
104.
Tierney, supra note 34, at 87.
105.
Id.
106.
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prelates for the feudal lands of their churches."o 7 The king could refuse
to accept that homage, and thus retained an effective veto over the
appointment. "[I]n practice[,] secular rulers continued to have a very large
say in the appointment of their bishops all through the Middle Ages."os
This was a local compromise, not a universal one, and it would remain to
negotiate compromises with individual powers for a long time to come.109
The result was victory for both sides-and neither side. That fact is
important to our understanding of freedom of the church, both in principle
and in practice. The Church surrendered a great deal: "No other course
had been left to it than to give up the theory-maintained with so much
force-of the spiritual character of clerical property and its inseparability
from the spiritual office."',o At the same time, the compromise had
important long-term effects. It preserved and enhanced some measure of
church autonomy and clerical authority, by driving "[t]he lay princes ...
out of the ecclesiastical sphere.""' By reposing that authority within the
Church, and at the same time reinforcing the Church's hierarchical structure
with the papacy at the top, it helped establish the Church as an institutional
power in the West, one with its own substantial bureaucracy, quasi-judicial
structure, and legal system. The compromise in effect helped create the
Church as a quasi-modem state."12
No less important was the effect of the compromise on the state. It
became substantially desacralized, forced to rely on its own secular
resources." 3 And it became ever more comfortable doing just that. From
the time of the Investiture Controversy through the rest of the Middle Ages
and beyond, the secular powers were determined to resist extreme versions
of the Gregorian assertion of church authority over them.1 4 Toward the
Tierney, supra note 34, at 86.
107.
108. Id.
109. See, e.g., LOGAN, supra note 47, at 107; cf TELLENBACH, supra note 39, at
123 (noting that royal investiture was tolerated by the papacy in particular cases both
before and afler Gregory's prohibition of the practice). For evidence that local compromises
continue to this day, see infra Part III.D.
TELLENBACH, supra note 39, at 124-25.
110.
Id. at 125.
111.
See generallyBERMAN, supra note 39; SOUTHERN, supra note 45.
112.
See, e.g., CANNING, supra note 41, at 104.
113.
114. See, e.g., Tierney, supra note 65, at 23. A classic example is the renewed
assertion of papal superiority by Pope Boniface VIII and his subsequent defeat by King
Philip of France, an episode that culminated in Boniface's concession that "whenever the
king so willed reason of state took precedence over clerical privilege." Tierney, supra
note 34, at 185. His defeat marked the nadir of the medieval papacy. Tierney adds:
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end of the 19th century, Pope Leo would observe wistfully, "There was
once a time when States were governed by the philosophy of the Gospel."' 15
Although many intervening causes contributed to that sense of "a world
gone-by,"ll 6 it may fairly be said that the militant Gregorian assertion of
libertasecclesiae helped light the fuse, creating the vigorous secular state as
a strong competitor to the Church and reinforcing the Church's own sense
of itself as a competing institution and interest group."' The kind of
dualistic version of the church-state relationship that characterizes the
modem version of "freedom of the church" was not, all things considered,
anything like what the Gregorian movement had in mind, its invocations
of Gelasius notwithstanding. But the movement's failure, or at least its
incomplete victory, may itself be said to have been an important source
of the modern conception of church-state dualism." 8
C. Freedom of the Church Up to and Circa 1965
Our story now jumps forward somewhat rashly across a span of centuries,
bypassing for the moment the rise of the Church as a form of transnational
government in the West, its political intrigues and negotiations with other
Western powers, its own internal failings and triumphs, and the landmarks
of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation.11 9 We pick up the thread in
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In this period, the Church was
once again forced to confront the scope and extent of its powers, the nature
of its relationship to the state, and the meaning of freedom of the church.
By the time it reached a modem resolution of this question at the Second
Vatican Council in the mid- 1960s, the meaning of "freedom of the church"
had undergone revolutionary changes, moving from a neo-Gregorian
resistance to the state to a neo-Gelasian support for the distinct but valuable
roles of both church and state. The modem version of libertas ecclesiae
would be quite different from the medieval version.
For both defenders and critics of freedom of the church in the
contemporary legal literature, history sometimes seems to begin and end

"Certainly the combination of an exalted theory of papal overlordship with a persistent
practice of using the spiritual authority of the popes to serve local ends sapped the prestige of
the Roman see to a degree that made possible the victory of Philip the Fair." Id.
115.
Patrick McKinley Brennan, Differentiating Church and State (Without Losing
the Church), 7 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 29, 38 (2009).
116.
Id.
117.
See generally JOSEPH R. STRAYER, ON THE MEDIEVAL ORIGINS OF THE MODERN
STATE (Princeton 2005) (1970).

118.
119.
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with the Investiture Controversy.12 0 Something happens in the interval
between the eleventh century and today, but mostly that something lies
in the realm of political and religious theory, not history. This shift from
event-driven history to intellectual history serves useful purposes for both
sides. For defenders of freedom of the church, it leaves the Canossa
narrative in place as the source of the modem concept of freedom of the
church, in more or less unbroken continuity with the present day. Whatever
changes in context may have occurred since then, freedom of the church
remains a single concept flowing from a singular historical fount.
For its critics, this approach means that the depiction of medieval
freedom of the church "in defensive terms-as the church's protection of
its authority in the face of an overbearing state, as the spiritual beating
back of the depredations of the temporal"-is rendered all the more
nostalgic and anachronistic.121 This positions freedom of the church for
two criticisms. The first-which we have seen is quite true-is that this
narrative is itself historically imperfect. Second, whatever justifications
the medieval version of freedom of church might have had, it is out of
place in the context of a modem liberal state, whose "commitment to
association and participation" is sufficiently protective of "religion (and
churches)" to obviate any need for a revival of freedom of the church.122
Both the defenders' and the critics' moves are unsatisfactory. The
former ignores dramatic and sometimes disturbing changes during that
period in the meaning of freedom of the church. The latter pays short shrift
to genuine threats posed to the Church in the course of the development of
modem liberalism-threats that make the idea of freedom of the church
seem much less anachronistic than a simple focus on the Investiture
Controversy alone does.' 2 3
Those threats are best represented by the French Revolution. From its
roots in resentment at clerical power and wealth, and in "the secularisation
of the French national psyche,"' 24 it reached a height of shocking violence,
with "more than 30,000 priests and untold tens of thousands of Catholic
120.
One exception is Brennan, supra note 115, who begins his defense of freedom
of the church with the expulsion of monasteries in early twentieth century France.
121.
Schwartzman & Schragger, supranote 5, at 928.
122. Id. at 944.
123.
Schwartzman and Schragger do note that "[a]nti-clericalism is an important
and powerful strain in Enlightenment thought," and observe that the French Revolution
"was in large part directed at the entrenched power of the Catholic Church." Id. at 952.
This is a rather light gloss on events.
124. DUFFY, supra note 22, at 254.
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laity killed or exiled from France, massive numbers of church properties
defaced, destroyed, or confiscated, and much priceless religious art,
literature, and statuary stolen or destroyed."1 2 5 Equally important was the
revolutionary state's takeover of the church. From a system in which the
Church formed one of the key estates of the social order, society was
redivided into "two parts: the state, which rules; and civil society, which

is ruled." 12 6

An emblematic moment was the enactment in 1790 of the Civil
Constitution of the Clergy, which reorganized the parishes and eliminated
many of them, turned clergy into salaried state officials, and declared that
henceforth all clergy and bishops would be elected by the people.1 2 7 This
system extended the right to select the officials of the Church to nonCatholic French voters, while stripping any power of appointment from
the Church hierarchy outside France, including the pope.128 The defenders
of the Civil Constitution made clear just how broad the state's claim of
authority was, declaring that "[a] state can decide whether or not to permit a
religion" and that "[w]e certainly have the power to change religion."' 29
Robespierre, responding to protests over these revolutionary innovations,
announced:
The nomination of bishops is an exercise of political power. So to privilege the
clergy over other citizens in this process is to ride roughshod over the principle
of political equality, which is the foundation of the Constitution. It amounts to
granting the clergy special political influence and reconstituting them as a
130
separate body.

This was far beyond anything Henry IV would have dreamed of. It certainly
suggests that post-medieval assertions of the freedom of the church are
no mere anachronism, and that suspicion of the depth of the liberal
state's commitment to the protection of "religion (and churches)" is not
unfounded.' 3'
It is important not to gloss over the scope and violence of the
revolutionary liberal state's assertion of authority over the church in this
period. But neither should we ignore the Church's dramatic response: the
vehement rejection of liberalism. As John Witte writes, the eighteenth and
125.
Witte, supra note 81, at 24.
126.
EMILE PERREAU-SAUSSINE, CATHOLICISM AND DEMOCRACY: AN ESSAY IN THE
HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT 8 (Richard Rex trans., 2012).
127.
See DUFFY, supra note 22, at 254-55; PERREAU-SAUSSINE, supra note 126, at

7-8.
128.
129.
130.

See PERREAU-SAUSSINE, supra note 126, at 12.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 9-10. For a recent argument against church autonomy that sounds in

almost Robespierrean tones, see Rutherford, supra note 5.
131.
Schwartzman & Schragger, supra note 5, at 944.
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nineteenth century Church "'pronounced' anathema on [the] radical
Enlightenment and its new ideas of liberty, democracy, and separation of
church and state[,] and called the faithful back to the ideals of a unified
Christendom under the moral and legal authority of the papacy."l 32 As
the liberal state had called into question the existence of the church as
anything other than an ordinary association, so the papacy in turn called
"the autonomy of the temporal sphere . .. into doubt."' 3 3
This move found its high-water mark in the Syllabus of Errors, issued
by Pope Pius IX in 1864. Its list of 80 propositions that violate Catholic
teaching includes many uncontroversial points.' 34 But others strike directly
at the liberal state and its freedoms. They include a rejection of churchstate separation and of the view that "the Catholic religion should [not] be
held as the only religion of the State, to the exclusion of all other forms of
worship," and the refusal of the pope to reconcile himself to "progress,
liberalism, and modern civilization."' 3 5
Modern-day apologists have argued that the Syllabus must be read in
light of the texts to which it refers,' 36 and must be understood in the
context of the era's anticlericalism and state coercion.137 That is true but
insufficient. There can be little doubt that this statement represents a
revival of the strong Gregorian position, and is hardly the same as what
we will shortly see is the modern Catholic concept of freedom of the

132.
Witte, supranote 8 1, at 24 (emphasis added).
133.
PERREAU-SAUSSINE, supra note 126, at 63; see also J. Bryan Hehir, The Modern
Catholic Church and Human Rights, in Witte, supranote 81, at 113, 114.
134. See DUFFY, supra note 22, at 295.
135.
Zachary R. Calo, Note, "The IndispensableBasis of Democracy": American
Catholicism,the Church-StateDebate, and the Soul ofAmerican Liberalism, 1920-1929,
91 VA. L. REv. 1037, 1046 (2005) (quoting POPE PIUS IX, SYLLABUS OF ERRORS (1864)).

136. See, e.g., Christopher T. Carlson, Church and State: Consistency of the Catholic
Church's Social Teaching, 35 CATH. LAW. 339, 356-57 (1994).
137.
See, e.g., Richard S. Myers, A Critique of John Noonan's Approach to
Development ofDoctrine, 1 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 285, 292 (2003) ("The basic point is that
the nineteenth-century popes were criticizing a far more extreme idea of civil liberty.");
MARITAIN, supra note 31, at 159 n.13 (observing that the proposition in the Syllabus
rejecting a non-exclusive Catholic state was issued in the context of the violent overturning of
prior concordats between church and state, and adding, somewhat disturbingly, "At such
moments no one is prepared to discard weapons that are at his command in actual fact.");
MURRAY, supra note 32, at 67-68 (arguing that the Syllabus rejected "freedom of religion and
separation of church and state" because they were predicated at the time on the "thesis of
the juridical omnipotence and omnicompetence of the state," which implied not separation
but "perhaps the most drastic unification of church and state which history had known").
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church.' 38 It is striking that the Syllabus itself, and an earlier papal
condemnation of liberal arguments for church-state separation, both came in
response to speeches and newspapers using the phrase "a Free Church in
a Free State," a phrase that would not be out of place among modern
defenders of freedom of the church.139
Reaction begets reaction. The French Revolution was far from the last
European war on the Church. In mid-to-late nineteenth century Prussia,
Bismarck's hostility to the Church led to the Kulturkampf in which the
state dominated, harassed, and expelled the Catholic Church and its
religious orders. Bismarck asserted that the Vatican's assertion of papal
infallibility in the First Vatican Council "had revived the most extravagant
claims of Gregory VII and Boniface
VIII: this time, however, he promised,
40
'We will not go to Canossa."'l
Similarly, militant French secularism and anticlericalism, and the
assertion that religious associations were wholly subordinate to state
authority and could be licensed or expelled at will, extended well past the
Revolution into the twentieth century. The French prime minister Emile
Combes stated at the time, "There can be no rights except the right of the
State, and there [is], and there can be no other authority than the authority of
the Republic."' 4 ' Similarly militant statements and actions could be found
elsewhere in Europe and abroad, as in post-revolutionary Mexico. In
short, neither the more extreme assertions of freedom of the church, nor
the more intolerable incursions of the state, had spent themselves by the
time the West reached modernity. However common the language
of dualism had become, each side continued to assert its dominance
over the other. By this time, however, a sense of exhaustion and chastening
had begun to emerge on both sides.14 2
The Second Vatican Council's Declaration on Religious Freedom,
Dignitatis Humanae, must be viewed in light of these events and the
accompanying sense of both exhaustion and genuine reconciliation. The
138. See, e.g., JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., A CHURCH THAT CAN AND CANNOT CHANGE:
THE DEVELOPMENT OF CATHOLIC MORAL TEACHING 155 (2005).
139.
See DUFFY, supra note 22, at 281-84 (describing the Church's rejection of the
arguments of Felicit6 de Lamennais, whose newspaper used that phrase), 295 (noting
that the Syllabus was issued in response to a speech by Count Charles Montalembert
titled "A Free Church in a Free State," arguing for "a reconciliation between the Church
and democracy").
140. Id. at 303.
141.
JOHN NEVILLE FiGGIs, THE GREAT LEVIATHAN, IN THE PLURALIST THEORY OF
THE STATE: SELECTED WRITINGS OF G.D.H. COLE, J.N. FIGGIS, AND H.J. LASKI 112 (Paul
Q. Hirst ed., 1989).
142.
See, e.g., Brennan, supra note 115, at 38 (noting Pius IX's acknowledgment
shortly before his death that his model of Church-state relations "had failed and that it
was time for a new approach").
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Declaration continues to insist on the truth and exclusivity of the Church's
claims on religious matters. But it takes a very different view than its
predecessors of the place of "the free exercise of religion in society."l 43
While asserting the existence of the one "true religion and ... the one
Church of Christ,"l 4 4 it also affirms that human beings are endowed with
dignity and a "moral obligation to seek the truth, especially religious truth,"
and that it would violate human dignity to subject this search to "external
coercion," whether the seeker's quest leads to Catholicism or some other
faith.145
At the same time, it champions not just individual rights, but also
freedom of the church. "The freedom or immunity from coercion in matters
religious which is the endowment of persons as individuals," it says, "is
also to be recognized as their right when they act in community." 4 6
Churches and other religious communities "have the right not to be hindered
[by government] ... in the selection, training, appointment, and transferral

of their own ministers, in communicating with religious authorities and
communities abroad," and in acquiring and building on church property.14 7
They have the right to engage in witness and proselytization, although
they should not abuse this right by engaging in coercive, abusive, or
deceptive tactics.14 8 They must be entitled "freely to hold meetings and
to establish educational, cultural, charitable and social organizations, under
the impulse of their own religious sense." 49 The Declaration recognizes the
legitimate role of the state-"the power of government and its rights"but cautions that "the higher rights of God are to be inviolate."5 o
"The freedom of the Church," in sum, "is the fundamental principle in
what concerns the relations between the Church and governments and
the whole civil order."' 5 ' The Church "claims freedom for herself in her
character as a spiritual authority," and "in her character as a society of
men who have the right to live in society in accordance with the precepts
of the Christian faith." 52 It claims "the independence which is necessary
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

DH,supra note 2, § 1.
Id.
Id. § 2.
Id. § 4.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id. § 11.
Id. § 13.
Id.
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for the fulfillment of her divine mission."' The freedom and autonomy
of the church, on this view, is "a structural feature of social and political
life" as well as "a moral right to be enjoyed by religious communities. It
is not simply an effect or implication of private, individual claims
to freedom of conscience and immunity from government coercion in
matters of religious belief."1 54
If the Declaration is forthright in its assertion of the natural and legal
status of both individual religious freedom and church autonomy, it is
vague on questions of establishment. 15 5 Government, it says, should "help
create conditions favorable to the fostering of religious life," both to enable
individuals to fulfill their religious duties "and also in order that society
itself may profit by the moral qualities of justice and peace which have
their origin in men's faithfulness to God and to His holy will."'15 It adds
two important caveats, however, which suggest something about both the
permissibility of religious establishment and its limits:
If, in view of peculiar circumstances obtaining among peoples, special civil
recognition is given to one religious community in the constitutional order of
society, it is at the same time imperative that the right of all citizens and religious
communities to religious freedom should be recognized and made effective in
practice.
Finally, government is to see to it that equality of citizens before the law, which
is itself an element of the common good, is never violated, whether openly or
157
covertly, for religious reasons. Nor is there to be discrimination among citizens.

This statement leaves a great many questions unanswered. But it
surely provides some guidance, particularly if read in contrast to the earlier
positions staked out by the medieval or even the nineteenth century papacy.
It does not forbid, but positively encourages, cooperation between church
and state. It does not appear to prohibit, and on some readings positively
desires, the public acknowledgment of God, although its equality provision
suggests some role for the public acknowledgment of other faiths.'5 8 But
it still sees some important limits here.
153. Id.
154. Richard W. Garnett, Standing, Spending, and Separation: How the NoEstablishment Rule Does (and Does Not) Protect Conscience, 54 VILL. L. REv. 655,
675 (2009).
155.
See, e.g., Russell Hittinger, Dignitatis Humanae, Religious Liberty, and
EcclesiasticalSelf-Government, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1035, 1039 (2000) (the
Declaration "is not a complete exercise in either the theory or the practice of Churchstate relations"); see also id. at 1043 (the Declaration "puts to one side theoretical
treatment of the issues which directly touch, in American terms, upon establishment of
religion").
156. DH, supra note 2, § 6.
157. Id.
158. See, e.g., MARITAIN, supra note 31, at 172-73.
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According to Jacques Maritain, one of the key influences on the
Declaration, government's role was to assist "the spiritual mission of the
Church. . . , not the political power or the temporal advantages to which
certain of her members might lay claim in her name." 5 9 It would
recognize "the juridical personality of the Church" and its status as "a
perfect and perfectly independent society"; but even a Christian society
"would have to hold that, in its own temporal sphere, Christian citizens
[and associations]... are no more legally privileged than any other
60
citizens.'o
The state wudi
would be "fully differentiated in its seua
secular type. ,161
Continuing the trend that began with the Investiture Controversy, the
state would be fully descralized. At the same time, the church would also
be differentiated from the state, left to "reach people through its direct
effect on individuals and society (rather than, as before, through the arm
of the state)."l 62 Its influence on and in the world would come through
service and persuasion, not coercion. Whatever is left within the realm
of permissible realm of establishment, it is a far cry from the kinds of
actions, by church or state, that were viewed by Gregory VII as necessary
implications of libertas ecclesiae.
D. Freedom of the Church Circa 2012
This historical tour, if more lengthy than the somewhat canned
narratives that accompany recent discussions of freedom of the church,
still falls short of doing justice to a complex story. Even so, in filling out
the story a little, it offers some lessons for the modem debate over freedom
of the church.
First, it cautions against undue romanticization of the story of the
Investiture Controversy. To be sure, none of the recent versions of the
story have concluded that it was an unmixed triumph for Pope Gregory
VII, or that Canossa represented a final capitulation of temporal power
to the authority of the Church. Still, the shorter the version of the story
presented, the more likely it is to leave the impression that Christian society
in that era was naively pious and spiritual, or that the struggle was one of
temporal power on one side against spiritual power on the other.

159.
160.
161.
162.

Id. at 173.
Id. at 175.
Id. at 176.
Brennan, supra note 115, at 39 (describing the views of Pope Leo XIII).
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In fact, both sides invoked religious arguments. Both sides wielded
political and military power and confronted its limits. Both sides were
embedded in a web of feudal relations and shifting alliances. The struggle
was intellectual and spiritual. But it was also a conflict of multiple interest
groups, all of them alien to contemporary circumstances and thus neither
wholly sympathetic nor wholly unsympathetic. We are better off viewing
the contending parties as historical actors, responding to and sparking
long-reaching historical phenomena, than we are selecting champions from
among them, whether the intrepid reforming Church or the nascent liberal
state.
Second, it suggests that the historical developments that followed the
Investiture Controversy matter too. Again, that is not to say that modem
discussions of freedom of the church leave out the period between the
eleventh century and today altogether. But they tend to shift from a full
historical analysis, when discussing the medieval era, to a mere genealogy
of ideas, such as sovereignty or conscience, in the post-medieval period.
For defenders of freedom of the church, this suggests that all that remains is
to figure out how "freedom of the church" translates into our modem
vocabulary. For the critics, it means that "freedom of the church" has been
yanked inappropriately from the mists of history int9 the modem era
of the liberal state. A fuller understanding of the historical interval between
Canossa and today suggests that the Church's own understanding of its
power and limits, and its relationship to the society that surrounded it,
continued to change in response to circumstances on the ground. It also
shows that those circumstances included serious threats to the Church's
very existence-threats that persisted long after the rise of the liberal state.
Finally, it suggests the dangers of treating freedom of the church as a
transcendent, transhistorical concept with a fixed definition. What "freedom
of the church" entailed and implied, whether in terms of the internal affairs
of the Church or its external relations with other powers, was always
deeply contingent on the status of church and state, the role of other interest
groups, and the changing social imaginaries that surrounded individuals
and communities within the broader society.163 Freedom of the church could
not, and did not, mean the same thing in the fifth, eleventh, nineteenth,
twentieth, or twenty-first centuries, nor could its implications and
164
emanations.16
Thus, current debates over freedom of the church, however much they
appear to draw on the past or on fixed and eternal principles, will ultimately
not have all that much to do with the simple revival of an ancient idea. Nor
163.
164.

See generally CHARLES TAYLOR, MODERN SOCIAL IMAGINARIES (2004).
See, e.g., supra note 81 (comparing Witte and Garnett's descriptions of the

medieval and modem scope of libertas ecclesiae respectively).
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can they simply be reduced by its critics to the task of laying to rest an
ancient anachronism. They will, first and foremost, be about defining
something called "freedom of the church," and discerning its scope and
limits, today.
III. FREEDOM OF THE CHURCH AND THE ECONOMICS OF RELIGION

History is one tool by which we can examine the concept of freedom
of the church, and it has been by far the most commonly used. But there
are other disciplinary tools in our toolkit. In this Part, I turn to economic
analysis, and the literature on the economics of religion, to examine
freedom of the church from another perspective.
After a general introduction to the field and its assumptions and
methods, I suggest that churches-including the Catholic Church, whose
history gave rise to both the ancient and modern concepts of "freedom of
the church"-can be viewed productively through a number of economic
lenses: as sellers of a particular kind of good, as organizations, as
occasional monopolists and frequent competitors, and as interest groups
that interact with regulators. This Part is mostly descriptive. I take up the
lessons we can draw from both economic and historical analysis of
freedom of the church in Part IV.
A. Introduction to the Economics ofReligion
The study of religion from an economic perspective is, quite literally,
at least as old as modem economics, and as old as the United States
itself. Its progenitor is the father of modern economics, Adam Smith. In
his classic book The Wealth of Nations, first published in 1776, Smith
argued that the economy can best be understood as a product of the
interactions of self-interested individuals. 165 Smith applied that insight to
a wide range of human conduct, including religion.' 66
As with other workers, Smith argued, the "industry and zeal" of the
clergy are "kept alive" in substantial part "by the powerful motive of
self-interest." 6 7 Smith's friend David Hume had argued that states would
165. See, e.g., ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 16-18 (Edwin Cannan ed.,
Modem Library 1994) (1776).
166. For a modem treatment of Smith and religion, see Laurence R. lannaccone,
The Consequences of Religious Market Structure: Adam Smith and the Economics of
Religion, 3 RATIONALITY & Soc'Y 156 (1991).

167.

Smith, supra note 165, at 848.
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benefit from established religion, because they could "bribe" the clergy
into "indolence" to the ultimate advantage of "the political interests of
society.",6 By contrast, Smith argued, in a fashion that is familiar to
students of the Madisonian view of faction,' 69 that the optimal approach
to church-state relations was to avoid establishment and encourage a
profusion of competitive faiths, with a concomitant moderating effect:
But if politics had never called in the aid of religion, had the conquering
party never adopted the tenets of one sect more than those of another, when it
had gained the victory, it would probably have dealt equally and impartially
with all the different sects, and have allowed every man to chuse his own priest
and his own religion as he thought proper. There would in this case, no doubt,
have been a great multitude of religious sects... . Each teacher would no doubt
have felt himself under the necessity of making the utmost exertion, and of
using every art both to preserve and to increase the number of his disciples. But
as every other teacher would have felt himself under the same necessity, the
success of no one teacher, or sect of teachers, could have been very great. The
interested and active zeal of religious teachers can be dangerous and troublesome
only where there is, either but one sect tolerated in the society, or where the
whole of a large society is divided into two or three great sects[.] .

. .

. But that

zeal must be altogether innocent where the society is divided into two or three
hundred, or perhaps into as many thousand small sects, of which no one could
be considerable to disturb the public tranquillity. The teachers of each sect,
seeing themselves surrounded on all sides with more adversaries than
friends, would be obliged to learn that candour and moderation which is so
seldom to be found among the teachers of those great sects[.]1 70

Beyond this broad exercise in political economy, Smith also delved into
the economic aspects of the religious behavior of both groups and
individuals at a more intimate level-tracing, for instance, what religious
economists today would call the movement from sect to church,17 ' the
growth of legal privileges such as benefit of clergy, 172 and the causes and
consequences of the Protestant Reformation. 173
Although Smith's discussion of the economics of religion lay largely
dormant for some two centuries, in the last forty years there has been an
explosion of work in this area by economists and other social scientists
employing economic tools. As Rachel McCleary observes, the economic
study of religion, following Smith's general approach, "is defined by two
theoretical schemes: rational choice and market theory."l 74
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The rational choice assumption holds that, "when faced with choices,
humans try to select the most rational or reasonable option."' 75 This
assumption applies to decisions about religion just as it does to other
human activities.17 6 Given both the potential short-term benefits of
religion, such as the acquisition of social capital, and the ultimate, highstakes, long-term benefits of religion-enlightenment now and immortality
afterwards-people may choose rationally to adopt religious beliefs.
Given different individual preferences, and the wide mix of costs involved
in particular choices about religious belief and observance, including
financial and other costs, time commitments, and search costs, the decision
to favor particular religions or sects is also subject to rational considerations.
In short, in light of their individual preferences, "people will try to
achieve their goals (i.e., their preferential needs and desires) in the least
costly manner possible given the various environmental and strategic
constraints that they face."' 77 Although preferences, costs, and benefits
may be harder to model in the religious arena than in other areas, it is still
a universal truth that people make choices under conditions of constraint
and will seek the greatest benefits at the lowest cost.
The market theory aspect of the economics of religion begins with the
basic assumption that churches exist in a "religious marketplace" -- a "social
arena wherein religious firms compete for members and resources."
Many faiths want their beliefs to be universal, and seek to attract new
members; even faiths that are generally characterized as non-proselytizing,
such as Judaism, want to avoid losing existing members. To that end,
religious doctrines or organizations, over time, may adjust or diversify the
package of costs and benefits they offer in order to maintain or increase
their market share. Moreover, the religious marketplace is a regulated
marketplace. Churches face governmental constraints on their ability to
attract members or retain revenue, and will seek to minimize those
constraints-and, often, to convince the regulator to transfer wealth to

175.
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STARK & FINKE, supra note 95, at 36.
See, e.g., EKELUND, HEBERT, & TOLLISON, MARKETPLACE, supra note 17, at 3.
GILL, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 10, at 28.
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them, or to constrain their competitors.' 7 9 In short, churches, like other
actors in a marketplace, will engage in rent-seeking behavior. 80
Another important aspect of the economics of religion literature is its
attempt to define and describe the nature of supply and demand in the
religious marketplace. The general assumption is that the real activity is
on the supply side. 81 This is in contrast to a good deal of conventional
historical work, which has emphasized supposed changes in the demand
for religion. Thus, the standard account of American religious history
often stresses the importance of the so-called "Great Awakenings,"
moments in which "the nation has been subject to periodic paroxysms of
public piety."l 82 The economic model instead treats the demand for
religion, and the kinds of material and spiritual goods it offers, as fairly
stable. Under that model, "religious change is largely the product of
supply-side transformations."' 83 In asking why particular faiths flourish
or die, how and why religious doctrines change, and why religious
participation in general increases or declines, it is more instructive to
examine developments in religious competition and the regulatory
environment than to speculate about changing views or needs on the part
of consumers. Human beings are always looking for answers to the
fundamental questions; the real dynamics lie in the kinds of "products"
on offer to the seekers.
The economic approach to religion represents a departure from much
if not most legal scholarship on church-state relations. It emphasizes a
view of the world in which "interests predominate over ideas." 84 By
contrast, most legal scholarship on law and religion, including much of
the best of it, privileges ideas over interests. It invokes history, but it
tends to emphasize intellectual history rather than a more jaundiced and
institutionally focused historical analysis.'8 5 It is also top-heavy with
179.

180.
32-34.
181.
182.

See generallyGILL, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 10.
See, e.g., EKELUND, HEBERT, & TOLLISON, MARKETPLACE, supra note 17, at

See, e.g., McCleary, supra note 10, at 22.
ROGER FINKE & RODNEY STARK, THE CHURCHING OF AMERICA,

1776-2005:

WINNERS AND LOSERS INOUR RELIGIOUS ECONOMY 87 (2005) [hereinafter FINKE & STARKE,
CHURCHING OF AMERICA].

183.

STARK & FINKE, ACTS OF FAITH, supra note 95, at 193. For arguments to this

effect, showing that the "Great Awakenings" were far less important than the conventional
account holds, see FINKE & STARKE, CHURCHING OF AMERICA, supra note 182, at 87-92.
As they note, the conventional account of the Great Awakenings has also come under
question by historians. See id. at 88 (citing, inter alia, JON BUTLER, AWASH IN A SEA OF
FAITH: CHRISTIANIZING THE AMERICAN PEOPLE (1990), and FRANK LAMBERT, INVENTING
THE "GREAT AWAKENING" (1999)).

184.

GILL, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supranote 10, at 27; see also id. at 57.

185.
See, e.g., Noah Feldman, The Intellectual Origins of the Establishment Clause, 77
N.Y.U. L. REv. 346 (2002).
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theory. In our field, a page of Rawls often outweighs a volume of financial
or demographic data.1 86 Apparently, as far as many church-state scholars
are concerned, the life of the law has been logic, not experience.' 87
Although there are exceptions,' 88 few law and religion scholars-too
few-analyze church-state law and relations through the same lens
of rational-choice and market-oriented analysis that has yielded so many
positive, if contested, results elsewhere in the legal academy.
It is also true that other religion scholars, some religious and some not,
have objected to the bloodless and clinical nature of the economics of
religion, or raised questions about its assumptions and methodology.
Thus, the theologian and historian Martin Marty argues that this approach
"contains no God or religion or spirituality, no issue of truth or beauty or
goodness, no faith or hope or love, no justice or mercy; only winning or
losing in the churching game matters."l 89 Robert Wuthnow, a leading
sociologist of religion, complains that the economic approach "fails to
illuminate about 90 percent of what I find interesting about religion." 90
Others have challenged some of the findings or methodology of the
economic approach more directly.' 9'
Of course, scholars of the economics of religion do not disdain or
ignore- the ideational or spiritual element of religion.192 They openly
acknowledge the limitations of an economic approach.19 3 But it remains
useful-certainly far more useful than its scarce use in law and religion
scholarship suggests. However other-motivated religious individuals
may be, they still make choices in a constrained environment: whether to
incur time and travel costs going to a nearby church or a more distant
one, whether to seek out religious sects that are widely available in town
186. A search of the JLR database on Westlaw for articles with some variant on the
word "religion" in the title and mentions of John Rawls in the text yields 343 documents.
A search of the JLR database for any mention of Laurence lannaccone, one of the
leading economists of religion for almost four decades, shows 33 results.
187.
Cf OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881) ("The life of
the law has not been logic; it has been experience.").
188.
See supra note 11.
189.

FINKE & STARKE, CHIJRCHING OF AMERICA, supra note 182, at xiii-xiv (quoting

Martin E. Marty).
190.

ROBERT WUTHNOW, AFTER THE BABY BOOMERS 256 (2008) (quoted in Witham,

supranote 10, at 8).
191. See, e.g., Steve Bruce, Secularization and Economic Models of Religious
Behavior, in OXFORD HANDBOOK, supra note 10, at 289.
192.
See, e.g., FINKE & STARKE, CHURCHING OF AMERICA, supra note 182, at xiv.
193.
See, e.g., EKELUND, HEBERT, & TOLLISON, MARKETPLACE, supra note 17, at 4-9.
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or travel to a different continent in search of locally inaccessible religious
ideas and communities, whether to donate time or money, whether to
take up a costly and inconvenient set of religious practices or adopt less
demanding practices.194 And whatever the sources of their beliefs and
authority, churches are also organizations, subject to resource constraints
and the imperfect human motivations and behavior of their leaders and
members. Churches also interact with governments and other regulators,
whose all-too-human motivations no one questions.
The economic approach to religion may, in short, be unsentimental,
incomplete, and imperfect. But it remains a valuable tool nonetheless.
On the margins, law and religion scholarship today is likely to benefit
more from a serious look at economics than from yet another discussion
of Rawls.
That is especially true for our subject: the freedom of the church and
the institutional freedom of religious organizations. An economic analysis
of this topic is valuable for several reasons. First, "[O]rganized bodies
imply organization and administration. Therefore, in order to understand
the workings of administrative bodies, it makes sense to turn to a science
like economics that seeks to explain the behavior of organizations."l 95
The central concern of freedom of the church is the institutional autonomy
of religious organizations. It makes obvious sense to examine how those
organizations function and the potential influences on their behavior.
Second, equally central to the role of freedom of the church in the
modern American context are the questions of how that concept interacts
with the political and cultural environment, and what relationship it bears to
basic legal concepts like nonestablishment.196 Rational-choice approaches
to the interaction between organizations and government are obviously
relevant to those questions.1 97
Third, freedom of the church is often treated by its supports as a
single, universal and indivisible principle. To the extent that it is, in
fact, applied inconsistently or opportunistically by religious organizations,
that may say something about the viability or applicability of the concept.
Here, too, economics may supply some explanatory and predictive power.
Fourth, as we saw in Part II, the story of freedom of the church involved
not just church autonomy, but ecclesiastical reform. The Catholic Church's

194. See, e.g., Laurence R. Iannaccone, Sacrifice and Stigma: Reducing Free-Riding in
Cults, Communes, and Other Collectives, 100 J. POL. ECON. 271 (1992); Laurence R.
Iannaccone, Why Strict Churches Are Growing, 99 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 99 (1994).
195.
EKELUND, HEBERT, & TOLLISON, MARKETPLACE, supra note 17, at 1.
196. See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 706 (rooting the ministerial exception
in both the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses).
197. See generally GILL, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 10.
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assertion of its right to be "left alone," and particularly to form its own
doctrines and make its own appointments free of interference from temporal
powers, formed a complex pattern of cause and effect with respect to the
real or perceived need for internal reform. The scope and implications of
"freedom of the church" necessarily changed as the nature and scope of
Church doctrine changed, both for reasons internal to the Church as a
religious organization and in response to external forces. The economics
of religion may help us to understand the internal and the external
influences on church reform and freedom of the church-and thus to
understand the causes, effects, and limits of freedom of the church.
Finally, at the level of legal doctrine, specific applications of freedom
of the church, such as the ministerial exception, may be subject in particular
cases to categorical limitations in scope or an outright balancing of
interests.198 Those questions, too, are subject to examination by a variety of
analytical tools, including economics.
In what follows, I argue that the economics of religion can help
organize and explain many historical phenomena that are relevant to the
evolution of churches and church doctrine and the principle of freedom
of the church. It also says something about the conditions and limits
under which it operates today.
B. Churches as Sellers (of Credence Goods)
Churches offer a "complex product" to consumers of religion, consisting
of a mixture of private and public goods and costs.' 99 The products they
offer include various religious goods, such as doctrine, moral guidance, the
remission of sins, and assurance of both present and future spiritual benefits.
They also include a variety of more or less tangible secular goods, including
the provision of social services, 200 network benefits, and various forms
of social and religious capital.20'
198. See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 710 (describing some limitations on
the scope of the ministerial exception).
199. EKELUND, HEBERT, & TOLLISON, MARKETPLACE, supra note 17, at 163.
200. See, e.g., Witham, supra note 10, at 189-90; FINKE & STARKE, CHURCHING OF
AMERICA, supra note 182, at 138-39, 155; EKELUND, HEBERT, & TOLLISON, MARKETPLACE,
supra note 17, at 30.
201. See, e.g., McCleary, supra note 10, at 13-16; Witham, supra note 10, at 17274; STARK & FINKE, ACTS OF FAITH, supra note 95, at 118-19; Laurence R. Iannaccone,
Religious Practice: A Human CapitalApproach, 29 J. SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF RELIGION
297 (1990).
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Many of the goods that churches offer are difficult to value properly.
Some, like the promise of salvation after death, are impossible to value
with assurance, whether before or after the religious consumer selects a
faith.202 They are classic credence goods: "goods [that] require that certain
types of assurances be given in order to satisfy purchasers because the
quality of the good in question cannot be determined either before or
after the sale."203
To assure potential purchasers of the superior quality of the religious
product they offer, and to assuage fears of fraud, churches may employ a
variety of signaling devices. Because the nature of the product offered is
complex and ambiguous, and its value difficult or impossible to certify,
those signaling devices mostly involve the agents of the religious
organization.204 The level of education and commitment that is required
for many priests and other religious authorities, for instance, and the
many costs they are willing to bear-not least, in the case of the Catholic
Church, priestly celibacy and poverty-suggest to potential followers
that they are confident of the value of their faith.205 The costs that priests
and other religious leaders incur for their faith "can assure consumers
that priests sincerely believe in life after death and believe that certain
steps must be taken to achieve it."206
Other forms of signaling are available, of course. Advertising the
existence of saints, martyrs, and other heroic figures who paid epic costs
for the faith may be one. 2 0 7 Large churches, cathedrals, and other major
building projects, which signal both the quality of the church and its
202. Barring a revelatory experience, of course. But I am unaware of any faiths,
and certainly no large mainstream faiths, that guarantee such an experience to their
consumers on a wholesale basis.
203.
EKELUND, HEBERT, & TOLLISON, MARKETPLACE, supra note 17, at 28. See generally
id at 27-29; ROBERT B. EKELUND ET AL., SACRED TRUST: THE MEDIEVAL CHURCH AS AN
ECONoMIC FIRM 26-27 (1996) [hereinafter EKELUND ET AL., SACRED TRUST]; Gill,
Religion and Civil Liberties, supra note 15, at 28 1.
204. EKELUND, HEBERT, & TOLLISON, MARKETPLACE, supra note 17, at 52.
205.
See id.; STARK & FINKE, ACTS OF FAITH, supra note 95, at 112. Stark and
Finke argue further that in regions where the clergy are well-compensated financially,
"there tends also to be a relatively low level of mass commitment and a quite high level
of antagonism toward ecclesiastics." STARK & FINKE, ACTS OF FAITH, supra note 95, at
112. As with other consumer goods, however, one can also imagine instances in which it
is precisely the wealth of the clergy that acts as a signal of the credence of the religious
good on offer. One example in the United States is the rise of "prosperity gospel" sects
of Christianity. See generally KATE BOWLER, BLESSED: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
PROSPERITY GOSPEL (2013).
206. Brooks B. Hull & Frederick Bold, Towards an Economic Theory of the Church,
16 INT'L J. Soc. ECON. 5, 11 (1989) (quoted in Witham, supra note 10, at 62).
207. See, e.g., Witham, supra note 10, at 62; Robert J. Barro, Rachel M. McCleary,
& Alexander McQuoid, The Economics of Sainthood (A Preliminary Investigation), in
Oxford Handbook,supra note 10, at 191.
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willingness to make "a substantial long-term commitment to maintaining
customers' satisfaction," are another.20 8 But certainly the willingness of
religious leaders in any number of religions to endure privation and strict
rules is a prominent signal of quality and sincerity.
This phenomenon of signaling the value of a particular religious
credence good is more than just an intriguing explanation of a particular
set of religious behaviors. It is directly relevant to the subject of freedom
of the church and its legal offspring, such as the ministerial exception
doctrine. Recall, again, one of the lessons of Part I of this Article: the
argument for church autonomy was inextricably intertwined with the
argument for church reform, specifically including the stricter enforcement
of rules against simony and nicolaitism-or, to put it positively, rules
requiring clerical poverty and celibacy. Corrupt, licentious, and selfserving behavior among the clergy not only interfered with the Church's
efforts to maintain control of its own property and ensure that its lands
and wealth did not pass to individual inheritors, although it did that as
well.209 It also signaled that the Church hierarchy was unable to maintain
control of its own officials, and weakened the "warranty" of quality that
celibacy and poverty made to "demanders and potential demanders
that the product was genuine." 210
We might view demands for the freedom of the church to regulate its
own affairs, and for the ability of churches to maintain control over the
conduct of their own officials regardless of generally applicable
employment laws, in this light. Most goods can be warranted effectively
in a variety of ways. Mercedes Benz can point purchasers to the latest
issue of Consumer Reports; a computer manufacturer can compare the
speed and quality of its product to those offered by others. A church
cannot point to figures comparing the number of its adherents currently
residing in Heaven to those of other faiths. Its primary means of ensuring

the quality of the signals it sends about the faith will be through its
representatives. Churches will understandably be jealous of governmental
efforts to interfere with their ability to select, monitor, and maintain the
quality of those representatives. Critics of the ministerial exception who
champion the application of employment discrimination laws to the clergy

208.
209.

Witham, supranote 10, at 63 (quoting Hull & Bold, supranote 206).
See, e.g., EKELUND ET AL., SACRED TRUST, supra note 203, at 32-33; EKELUND,
HEBERT, & TOLLISON, MARKETPLACE, supranote 17, at 148-49.
210. EKELUND, HEBERT, & TOLLISON, MARKETPLACE, supra note 17, at 149.

97

and other ministerial employees, and think of these laws as involving
only a marginal incursion on religion, may not fully appreciate the stakes
involved on the religious side of the ledger, for religious "buyers" and
"sellers" alike.
Of course, all these religious goods are purchased at a cost. The full
price of religion includes donations to the church or others, the time
committed to assisting or working in the church, and the foregoing of
other opportunities, both religious and secular. Cost considerations are
largely beyond the scope of this Article. But a few words are necessary,
because the costs of religious products, and the response of religious
organizations to those costs, are relevant to certain aspects of religious
competition, and to the nature and consistency of some claims about
freedom of the church, especially in the modern era.
For those religious entities that are capable of diversification, the
212
products offered may vary substantially in price. Particularly in monopoly
situations, the diversity of services and fees available, and the agency
problems that arise the larger a church gets, can lead to rent-seeking by
the church or segments within it. That rent-seeking may lead to increased
consumer demand for alternatives and, depending on how effective the
church monopoly is, increased competition, which in turn may lead to
changes in that church's behavior.2 13
Churches face competition and threats from a variety of sources. Those
threats may be internal, stemming from the agency problems inherent in
large enterprises. 2 14 They may involve free-riding church members, who
consume goods without paying full price.215 They may be external threats of
competition from rival faiths.2 16 They may involve secular goods that
compete with the church for consumers; for example, the repeal of the
Sunday blue laws appears to have led to a decline in church attendance

211.
See, e.g., id. at 55-56; see also, e.g., Corry Azzi & Ronald G. Ehrenberg,
HouseholdAllocation of Time and Church Attendance, 83 J. POL. ECON. 27 (1975).
212.
See generally EKELUND ET AL., SACRED TRUST, supra note 203; EKELUND,
HEBERT, & TOLLISON, MARKETPLACE, supra note 17.
213.
See, e.g., EKELUND, HEBERT, & TOLLISON, MARKETPLACE, supra note 17, at 130;
STARK & FINKE, ACTS OF FAITH, supra note 95, at 159.
214.
See, e.g., EKELUND ET AL., SACRED TRUST, supra note 203, at 17-59. As we

saw in Part II, much of the church reform movement that was such an essential part of
the Investiture Controversy, and thus of the demand for libertas ecclesiae, was driven by
desires to centralize the Catholic Church under the direction and control of the papacy.
215.

See, e.g., EKELUND, HEBERT, & TOLLISON, MARKETPLACE, supra note 17, at

26-27.
216.
See generally FINKE & STARKE, CHURCHING OF AMERICA, supra note 182; see
also EKELUND, HEBERT, & TOLLISON, MARKETPLACE, supra note 17, at 105-60 (discussing

the competitive aspects of the Protestant Reformation and the Catholic CounterReformation).
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as other activities became available.217 They may also involve some of
the key social services that churches provide or used to provide, as the
government provides social services that threaten to "crowd out" the
social services offered by the church.2 18 Finally, the church may face
regulatory pressures from government that drive up its costs or seek to
suppress it altogether.2 19
Churches may respond to these pressures in several ways. One potential
response is closely associated with changes in Christianity in the past
two centuries or so, and with the so-called "secularization thesis," which
posits that the gradual secularization of society will ultimately kill off
religion. 2 20 That is to lower the full price of religion for consumers or
would-be consumers, by lowering the cost of particular religious products or
mandatory donations. Reducing the tithe owed a church from ten percent to
five percent would be an example. Indirect methods of lowering price
are even more important. Churches can lessen the demands placed on
members by religious doctrine by changing that doctrine, thus decreasing
the tension between members' religious obligations and their secular or
worldly obligations and desires. 22 1
Alternatively, and somewhat counter-intuitively, churches can respond
to competition by increasingthe price of the religious product they offer.
This approach has been the focus of much of the work of the leading
economist of religion, Laurence lannaccone. 222
Here, the "cost" that is increased is not so much the direct financial
contribution required to the church 2 23 as it is the strictness and
distinctiveness of the demands made on believers by the church. In
addition to demanding greater time commitments, a church may introduce
new religious doctrines, or vigorously enforce old ones, that make it

217. See, e.g., Jonathan Gruber & Daniel Hungerman, The Church versus the Mall:
What Happens When Religion Faces Increased Secular Competition?, 123 Q.J. ECON.
831 (2008).
218. See, e.g., Daniel M. Hungerman, Rethinking the Study ofReligious Markets, in
OXFORD HANDBOOK, supra note 10, at 257, 266.
219.

See generally GILL, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 10.

220. See, e.g., STARK & FINKE, ACTS OF FAITH, supra note 95, at 29; Witham, supra
note 10, at 139-59.
221.
See, e.g., STARKE & FINKE, ACTS OF FAITH, supra note 95, at 142-43, 151-54;
FINKE & STARKE, CHURCHING OF AMERICA, supra note 182, at 235-83.
222.
See, e.g., supranote 194 (citing articles by lannaccone).
223.
Although that approach arguably features in the "prosperity gospel" movement,
see BOWLER, supra note 205.

99

difficult to be both religious and secular, to assimilate to the larger
society or move in and out of a faith community at will. 2 24
We might call this the "Ninotchka strategy," after a line from the
classic comedy in which Greta Garbo, playing a Soviet official, announces
that after the latest purges, "There are going to be fewer but better
Russians." 22 5 This approach may reduce the number of members of a
church. But it also makes the church more distinctive in the product it
offers, and enhances its apparent value as a credence good by suggesting
that any church that raises the cost of commitment must be offering
something real and beneficial. It also discourages free riders, both by
increasing the costs of membership and by making it easier to monitor
back-sliders and opportunists within a smaller and more distinctive church
community. In the long run, maintaining a distinctive and costly product
may do more to ensure the church's survival than going mainstream.226
These different approaches have been widely discussed in the economics
of religion literature. They can be variously described as encompassing
the difference between churches as "clubs" and churches as "firms," 2 27
between "sects" and "churches," 2 28 or between "high-tension" and "lowtension" religions.229
These phenomena, too, are more than a mere curiosity. They illuminate
certain aspects of the general discussion of freedom of the church and
attendant legal doctrines. In their important book, The Churching of
America, 1776-2005: Winners and Losers in Our Religious Economy,
Roger Finke and Rodney Starke argue that "to the degree that
denominations [in the United States] rejected traditional doctrines and
ceased to make serious demands on their followers, they ceased to prosper.
The churching of America was accomplished by aggressive churches

224. This is one effect of the strict behavior, distinctive dress, and removal of
children from public schooling at an early age that characterizes sects like the Old Order
Amish or the Satmar Hasidim. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Bd.
of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994).
225. NINOTCHKA (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios 1939). This was the approach
advocated by the previous Pope, Benedict XVI. For discussion and debate on that point,
see Joseph A. Komonchak, "Asmaller but purer Church?," DOTCOMMONWEAL, Oct. 21,
2010, http://www.commonwealmagazine.org/blog/?p=10517.
226. See generally FINKE & STARKE, CHURCHING OF AMERICA, supranote 182.
227. See, e.g., McCleary, supra note 10, at 11-12; Laurence R. lannaccone & Feler
Bose, Funding the Faiths: Toward a Theory of Religious Finance, in OXFORD HANDBOOK,
supra note 10, at 323.
228. See, e.g., EKELUND, HEBERT, & TOLLISON, MARKETPLACE, supra note 17, at
278 n.45 (discussing the work of the sociologist of religion Ernst Troeltsch, who first
described the "church"-"sect" distinction); STARKE & FINKE, ACTS OF FAITH, supra note

95, at 142-46, 203-08, 259-76.
229.
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committed to vivid otherworldliness." 230 By and large, the enforcement of
generally applicable legal rules such as antidiscrimination laws to religious
organizations, or the application of mainstreaming rules to individual
religious practices, such as restrictions in other countries on wearing the
hijab in public, make it difficult for churches to adopt the Ninotchka
strategy. The enforcement of such laws lowers the costs of religious
observance for observers. In doing so, however, it also reduces a religion's
ability to combat free-riding and to maintain its distinctiveness against both
religious and secular competitors.
Whatever one ultimately concludes about the descriptive or normative
value of the secularization thesis, it is clear that laws that affect a church's
decision to raise or lower the costs of religious observance interfere
significantly with its doctrines and their development. More seriously
still, to the extent that such laws generally favor lowering rather than raising
the costs of religion, and thus "mainstreaming" those churches, they may
ultimately harm those churches' prospects of long-term survival by reducing
their distinctiveness and brand value. This makes it more apparent why
churches are concerned about such laws, why they would insist so
vehemently on maintaining doctrinal autonomy as against the force of
generally applicable laws, and why those arguments are about more than
just some arrogant desire to remain "above the law" 23 1-are, indeed,
potentially about the very survival of those churches in a competitive
religious and secular marketplace.
By way of segue into the next section, it is worth noting that a particular
church need not go all in, adopting either a cost-raising or a cost-lowering
approach to religious doctrine in the face of competition. Instead, it can
take both approaches at the same time, offering a diversified range of
religious product lines that can satisfy varied consumer preferences for
high- or low-tension religious doctrines and practices. An example from
within the Catholic Church is the proliferation of different religious orders,
in addition to the local clergy, that could cater to the "spiritual needs of
the more intellectually inclined and to higher-income individuals," as well
as to the poor.232 Multinational churches can diversify not only according to
product lines, but also according to differing preferences in different local or

230.
231.
232.

FINKE & STARKE, CHURCHING OF AMERICA, supra note 182, at 1.
See, e.g., Corbin, supra note 5; Griffin, supra note 5.
EKELUND ET AL., SACRED TRUST, supra note 203, at 21.
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regional markets. 23 3 So cost-based responses to competition for religious
consumers are not limited to a decision either to raise or lower costs
altogether. Like other large producers of goods, large religions can and
do choose from among an array of options and offer a range of products.
"In my Father's house are many mansions." 234
Similarly, churches can adopt a range of doctrinal responses to
regulatory regimes in different markets, adopting one or the other
strategy as necessary, just as a multinational corporation may choose to
respond to varied labor laws in different countries by raising wages in
one nation, offering low wages in another, and lobbying for special
exemptions or subsidies in a third. On the one hand, as I argue below,
this may help explain the resurgence of arguments for "freedom of the
church" or institutional autonomy in the United States in recent years.
On the other hand, the willingness of churches to diversify in this way
may raise questions about the sincerity of, or necessity for, arguments
for freedom of the church or institutional autonomy. The willingness of a
church to capitulate to regulatory demands in one place while insisting
on autonomy in another, depending on the political calculus in each
place, will provoke a cynical reaction and raise questions about the need
for and value of such autonomy. Furthermore, to the extent that a church
claims that freedom of the church is a universal, transcendent, or transhistorical principle of vital importance, its actions may belie that claim
and seriously undercut its arguments for institutional autonomy.
C. Churches as (Monopolistic or Competitive) Firms
The discussion so far in this Part has focused mostly on churches as
vendors of religious "products" to individual "consumers" of religion. In
reducing religious doctrines to products or product lines, and describing
individuals as making religious commitments based on some form of
rational cost-benefit analysis, it is perhaps most susceptible to Martin
Marty's charge that such an approach boils away religion's essence,
depriving it of "God or religion or spirituality," "truth or beauty or
goodness," "faith or hope or love," and so on.235
In this section, I focus on churches as entities. That is fitting for a
Symposium whose subject is "freedom of the church"-whose very point is
a move away from religious liberty as an individual matter to a
consideration of the religious liberty of institutions. Taking religious

233.
234.
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102

See id. at 21-22.
John 14:2 (King James).
FINKE & STARKE, CHURCHING OF AMERICA, supra note 182, at vii (quoting

Marty).

[VOL. 21: 59, 2013]

Freedom of the Church Without Romance
JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY LEGAL ISSUES

institutions seriously as institutions, subject to the general constraints

and incentives that drive all institutions, may teach us something about
the causes, consequences, and limits of freedom of the church.
The explicitly institutional focus also blunts the force of the criticism
that the economics of religion is too worldly an approach to an essentially
otherworldly phenomenon. Few would deny that even if divine providence
exists, human organizations are still frequently subject to human limitations.
The miracle of the loaves and fishes is not an everyday event. Most of
the time, religious organizations struggle to survive arid thrive in a world
of limited resources. Nor, even assuming the existence of revelations
from beyond, do people march in lockstep, seized by the same revelation
and the same understanding of how to implement it in the world. Most
of the time, they must do their imperfect best to organize and coordinate
their actions. We may therefore learn something about freedom of the
church by considering how these organizations function as a general
matter.
Here, there is an especially strong overlap with the kinds of issues that
we discussed in our look at the history of freedom of the church in Part I.
The source and subject of the most influential debates about freedom of
the church, the Catholic Church, is a prototypical organization. The
development of freedom of the church and the kinds of issues that
surrounded it can be better understood when viewed through an
organizationally focused economic lens.
The most useful work on this subject has been done by the economist
Robert Ekelund and his colleagues.236 Begin with the truism that "[a]s
groups grow, it becomes increasingly difficult to coordinate activitiesto make and pursue decisions."237 Most of the time, they respond to this
dilemma by devoting more resources to the administration of the
enterprise, with the usual result that "authority will become more centralized
and policies will be standardized." 23 8

236. See EKELUND ET AL., SACRED TRUST, supra note 203, EKELUND, HEBERT, &
TOLLISON, MARKETPLACE, supra note 17. For a brief popularized overview, see Witham,
supra note 10, at 82-85. A similar but more sociologically oriented discussion is
provided in STARKE & FINKE, ACTS OF FAITH, supra note 95, ch. 6.
237.
STARKE & FINKE, ACTS OF FAITH, supra note 95, at 162.

238. Id. As we will see below, it is not fully accurate to say that policies will
inevitably be standardized. A centralized organization may decide to take different
approaches to policies in different regions and circumstances. Moreover, even centralized
groups that pursue standardized policies will be subject to agency problems that result in
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The medieval Church, around and following the time of the great
Gregorian reforms and the Investiture Controversy, can be understood in
light of this fact. The medieval Church closely resembles a modem form
of organization: "the multidivisional or 'M-form' firm." 239 Such firms
are "characterized by a central office that controls overall financial
allocations and conducts strategic, long-term planning, but allows divisions
(usually regional) a high degree of autonomy in day-to-day operations. 24o
Thinking of a church as a firm--of the problems to which this institutional
formation is a response, of the ongoing problems to which it must respond,
and of the incentives and institutional tendencies the firm structure
encourages-helps us to understand some of the historical developments
in the Catholic Church and their relationship to the concept of freedom
of the church, and to understand its subsequent actions.
The development of a firm, and particularly an M-form firm, model of
the Church was a natural response to the burdens of success. As the
resources, geographic scope, and numbers of the Church grew, 24 1 it
naturally became concerned about "managerial problems of inefficiency." 2 42
The early Church had been much more decentralized, and the papacy
lacked effective "central authority" over the Church's far-flung units. 2 43
This weakness also rendered the Church vulnerable to interference by
local secular authorities.244
Some decentralization was a good thing, allowing Church authorities
to respond to local circumstances, particularly in an era in which
communication between different Church outposts was difficult. 245 Too
much decentralization, however, posed a threat to the Church as a going
concern. "Given the make-up of the medieval Church," Ekelund and his
colleagues write, "there were ample opportunities for managerial rent
seeking and X-inefficiency." 24 6 Local priests or units of the Church could

diverse policies on the ground. Centralization and standardization are responses to
agency problems, but they are hardly completely successful responses.
239. EKELUND ET AL., SACRED TRUST, supra note 203, at 20; see generally id., ch.
2.
240. Id. (citing Oliver E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND
ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS (1975)).
241.
See, e.g., id. at 8, 19.
242. EKELUND, HEBERT, & TOLLISON, MARKETPLACE, supra note 17, at 94.
243. EKELUND ET AL., SACRED TRUST, supra note 203, at 17.
244. See id. at 17.
245. See id. at 20.
246. Id. at 30. "X-inefficiency" is the "[fjailure of a firm or other organization to
get the maximum possible output from the input it uses, or to produce its output with the
minimum use of inputs. X-inefficiency implies that there is slack in the organization."
JOHN BLACK, NIGAR HASHIMZADE, & GARETH MYLES, OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS
444 (4th ed. 2012).
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divert revenue from the Church itself to those local units or, in cases of
simony for instance, directly to themselves.247 They could also shirk
their responsibilities to the Church.248 Finally, local priests or Church
bodies might ignore or revise religious doctrine, to ease their own jobs,
to realize personal profit, or to respond to local competition, secular
regulation, and other circumstances.
All of these actions risked "damaging the reputation of the institutional
Church" 249 and harming its financial health. Particularly given that the
Church's product was a credence good, local rent-seeking or general
organizational slack presented a serious problem. Organizing along the
lines of an M-form firm was a response to those concerns. 25 0 By
emphasizing Church reform, reinforcing the central hierarchy of the
papacy and stocking that "office" with a host of similarly reform-minded,
expert administrators, and asserting the freedom of the Church as a bulwark
against control by local governments, Gregory VII and his successors
created a "general office" that was "principally concerned with strategic
decisions involving planning, appraisal, and control [of the Church],
including the allocation of resources among the (competing) operating
divisions," and which was overseen by "[a]n elite staff," "attached to
the general office," which helped "secur[e] greater control over operating
division behavior." 2 5 1 In short, the governance model adopted by the
medieval Church, its struggle for independence from local secular control,
and its attempts to avoid rent-seeking or agency slack by lower local
Church officials, all made sense. The rise of that governance model explains
how and why internal Church reform and the movement for freedom of
the church were so closely related.
As a firm, the Church faced two substantial incentives. On the one
hand, it sought to establish and maintain an effective monopoly within
the religious marketplace.252 In stable monopoly circumstances, one

247. See, e.g., EKELUND ET AL., SACRED TRUST, supra note 203, at 32-33 (discussing
"proprietary simony").
248. See id. at 30 (characterizing this as an example of X-inefficiency in the Church).
249. Id.
250.
See, e.g., EKELUND, HEBERT, & TOLLISON, MARKETPLACE, supra note 17, at 33.
251.
EKELUND ET AL., SACRED TRUST, supra note 203, at 20; see also STARK&
FINKE, ACTS OF FAITH, supra note 95, at 162; McCleary, supra note 10, at 24-25.
252.
Cf EKELUND, HEBERT, & TOLLISON, MARKETPLACE, supra note 17, at 67

(discussing scholarship arguing that "there might be a tendency toward natural monopoly
in religion"); McCleary, supra note 10, at 19 (predicting that "if no Smithian state exists
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might expect that the Church would engage in rent-seeking, using its
position to attempt to increase its revenue. 2 53 On the other, it would also
wish to stave off competition, either by aggressively attempting to maintain
its monopoly position against would-be market entrants254 or, in situations
of more genuine competition, attempting to provide a more attractive
product than the one offered by its competitors.
This description of churches as entities or firms, whether monopolistic
or competitive, provides useful explanatory and predictive power. It ties
together a host of doctrinal and other behaviors by the Church from the
medieval era forward, showing how its actions and doctrines across a
range of issues and over a span of centuries proceeded from a common
set of organizational incentives. It suggests something about why the
Church would want to assert libertas ecclesiae as a governing principle,
how it would use its status as an autonomous institution, and why those
actions would necessarily run into limits. Here are some examples.
Usury. "The most overt economic doctrine of the medieval Church
was its doctrine concerning usury-charging interest on a loan."255
Usury had long been condemned in Jewish and Christian thought, on the
grounds that taking a profit on a loan to others is a sin. In 1139, the Second
Lateran Council "denounced usury as a form of theft and required
restitution from those who practiced the sinful act." 25 6 But the Church
was also a major lender and borrower. Ekelund and his colleagues argue
that "Church officials frequently manipulated the usury doctrine to
create or bolster the monopoly power of the Church."25 It "acted as a
monopolist when it lent funds but as a monopsonist or single buyer
when it was a borrower of funds." 2 5 8 When it acted as a lender, it priced
"loans inside the Church at market rates (or above), thus extracting

to minimally regulate the religion market, then religions will tend toward a monopolistic
market, not a pluralistic one").
253. See, e.g., Witham, supra note 10, at 84.
254. In doing so, as we will see, the Church (or any similarly situated religious
monopoly) would likely employ a variety of tools, including the use of doctrine, the use
of force, and attempts to convince the secular regulatory authorities to reinforce its
monopoly status. The latter point, we shall see, is especially relevant to modem discussions of
freedom of the church, and it is well covered in GILL, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 10.
255. Robert B. Ekelund, Jr., Robert F. Hebert, & Robert D. Tollison, The Political
Economy ofthe Medieval Church, in OXFORD HANDBOOK, supra note 10, at 305, 311.
256. EKELUJND, HEBERT, & TOLLISON, SACRED TRUST, supra note 203, at 115.
257. Id. at 116. They add: "We do not assert that the medieval Church invented the
doctrine of usury ... for its own economic gain. Rather, we contend that in spite of its
original (and perhaps lasting) concern for justice, the Church recognized, and acted on,
the rent-seeking opportunities of the doctrine at a certain juncture in its history." Id. at
117.
258. Id. at 114-15.
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rents." 25 9 But when borrowing money, it rigorously enforced the usury
doctrine, "thereby extracting rents by reducing its cost of credit on certain
loans." 26 0 This action obviously served pecuniary goals. But it served
non-pecuniary goals as well, indirectly exploiting ambiguities in the
doctrine "to augment the power of the papal monopoly, including its farflung bureaucracy." 2 6 1 It also aided the Church in its efforts to "secure
more fighting personnel" in the Crusades, which themselves served
monopolistic and anti-competitive purposes, by "dispens[ing] restitution
for usurers who volunteered to fight the infidels."26 2
Simony. The sale of Church offices was a central concern of the
Gregorian reforms and a major part of the bundle of issues that gave rise
to Gregory VII's aggressive arguments for freedom of the church. Here
we must distinguish between "professionalsimony" and "proprietary
simony."263 Professional simony consisted of payment for professional
services by priests. This was a longstanding practice and made eminent
economic sense, as it provided a revenue stream for local branches of the
Church, some of which would go to the central Church, and because it
"gave customers the wherewithal to reward efficient, and discourage
inferior, clerical services."264 At the same time, professional simony gave
rise to concems about local rent-seeking and inefficiency that might harm
the credence value of the religious product sold by the Church. The
Church responded by permitting professional simony but regulating it. It
took a "common carrier"-type approach that allowed the charging of fees
for services, but limited the amount that could be charged and forbade
priests from withholding their services to exact payment from customers.2 65
Proprietary simony consisted of "the purchase and sale of all manner
of Church assets, including land, offices, relics, and consecrated vessels." 266
As Ekelund et al. note, "[u]nlike professional simony, proprietary simony
did not reward efficient behavior. Rather, it was a pure drain on Church
resources, in short, theft of Church property." 267 The permanent loss of
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.

Id. at 117.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 121.
Id. at 32 (citing

264.
265.
266.
267.

Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.

ROBERT E. RODES, JR., ECCLESIASTICAL ADMINISTRATION IN
MEDIEVAL ENGLAND: THE ANGLO-SAXONS TO THE REFORMATION 46 (1977)).
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Church property, and the diversion of its value into private clerical pockets,
deprived the Church of revenue and undermined its ability to function as
a seller of a credence good. Moreover, given the Church's decentralized
nature, this behavior was difficult to monitor effectively. Accordingly,
proprietary simony was dealt with more harshly, and was a major target
of the Gregorian reforms.268
Nicolaitism. Another major thrust of the Gregorian reforms was the
movement to enforce priestly celibacy. As we saw earlier in this Part,
celibacy was an important means of maintaining the value of the Church's
religious product as a credence good. The high costs involved in
forswearing a life of earthly comforts, including connubial ones, signaled
the value of the product. It is thus understandable that nicolaitism was
targeted for reform. The connection between celibacy and religious
products as credence goods also emphasizes, supportively this time, the
importance to a religion of maintaining control over the selection of its
clergy and the behavioral rules that apply to it, despite the existence of
antidiscrimination laws and other secular legal employment regimes. It
thus reinforces the arguments for freedom of the church and for particular
legal doctrines such as the ministerial exception.
Priestly celibacy served an additional function for the Church as a
whole. The passage of Church property from individual clergy into the
hands of their inheritors risked depriving the Church of its own property
and revenues. 269 Legal conditions in medieval Europe made it difficult
and costly to address this. Thus, "the Church found it expedient to legislate
mandatory celibacy." 27 0
Lay Investiture. Similar imperatives and incentives were arguably at
work in the central concern of the Investiture Controversy: the control
over the selection of Church officials by the centralized papacy rather
than by local secular officials. Its goal, again, was to "limit[ ] opportunistic
behavior [by] downstream suppliers of its chief product-assurance of
eternal salvation."27 1
We saw in Part I that from a historical perspective, the Investiture
Controversy, and the accompanying arguments for (and against) freedom of
the Church, involved a broad struggle for power, loyalty, and resources
among a variety of leaders and constituencies. But resistance to lay
investiture, like resistance to secular control over the circumstances of
ministerial employment today, also protected the Church as seller of a
268. See id. at 32-33.
269. See id. at 33 (noting that "[diuring the early Middle Ages, benefices were
often hereditary and came to be 'owned' by families for long periods of time.").
270. Id.
271.
Id. at 113.
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credence good. It guarded against having officials thrust on it who would
weaken the value and credibility of the Church's religious product. From
this perspective, the Church was right to resist-although, as we will see, it
hardly did so with total consistency.
Auricular Confession. Whether it is seeking continued loyalty or
enhanced revenues, a religious entity will have strong incentives to
respond to varied consumer resources and preferences. Individual oral
confession between priest and penitent, or auricular confession, can be
viewed from an economic perspective as serving this purpose. 27 2 Although
private confession has always been a part of Church practice, it was not
always the sole or even the dominant mode of confessing and forgiving sin.
For a substantial period of time, general public confession was common, 27 3
with private auricular confession only becoming truly dominant in the
high Middle Ages 27 4 and firmly established by the Council of Trent in the
mid-fourteenth century. Because such confessions were heard by local
priests with an intimate knowledge of their parishioners, the priest would
be well aware of "the income profile of each penitent and other pertinent
characteristics regarding wealth and tastes."" Penance could be closely
tailored to the individual resources and demands of the penitent. The
local nature of the parish structure made forum-shopping difficult and
thus prevented "arbitrage and retrading,"27 6 at least for the less wealthy.
Finally, "the secrecy of the confessional precluded tariff schedules from
being published.",7 7 In short, auricular confession made it possible for

272.

See, e.g., id. at 161; EKELUND, HEBERT, & TOLLISON, MARKETPLACE, supra

note 17, at 33-34; Benito Arrufiada, Catholic Confession of Sins as Third-PartyMoral
Enforcement (Universitat Pornpeu Fabra, Barcelona, Spain, Working Paper 2004), http://
www.econ.upf.es/-arrunada. For a historical overview, see, e.g., P. BILLER, CONFESSION
IN THE MIDDLE AGES: INTRODUCTION, IN HANDLING SIN: CONFESSION IN THE MIDDLE

AGES 3 (P. Biller & A.J. Minnis eds., 1998); H.C. LEA, A HISTORY OF AURICULAR
CONFESSION AND INDULGENCES INTHE LATIN CHURCH (1968 reprint) (1896); T.N. TENTLER,
SIN AND CONFESSION ON THE EVE OF THE REFORMATION (1977).

273.

See Arrufiada, supra note 272, at 13; EKELUND ET AL., SACRED TRUST, supra

note 203, at 157.
274.
275.

See EKELUND, HEBERT, & TOLLISON, MARKETPLACE, supra note 17, at 34.
EKELUND ET AL., SACRED TRUST, supra note 203, at 161.

276.
277.

Id.
Id.
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the Church to respond to elastic consumer preferences-and made it
easier to raise revenue and engage in price discrimination. 278
Purgatory and Indulgences. The discussion of auricular confession
dovetails with another set of innovations: the rise of the Catholic doctrine of
purgatory and the growth of the market in indulgences. 279 Purgatory was
a medieval innovation. From a theological perspective, purgatory gave
"sinners a 'second chance' to prepare themselves for heaven." 280 From
an economic perspective, purgatory "essentially introduced a means of
'deferred payment,' which not only allowed atonement to be postponed
beyond this life, but also allowed third parties to make payments on
behalf of the deceased." 2 8 1
Purgatory formed part of a "system," along with auricular confession
and another innovation, the granting of indulgences.2 82 Indulgences,
whether wholesale (as in the issuance of general indulgences to induce
participation in the Crusades) or as a retail payment for the remission of
sin and the commutation of time in purgatory, served a number of
purposes. Obviously, their use was a means of raising revenue directly.
Other forms of indulgence did so indirectly, while priming the pump of
local economies: for example, some indulgences were issued at no direct
cost for pilgrims who visited Rome a certain number of times during a
jubilee year. 283 Because indulgences were issued by the pope, they were
also a means of centralizing revenue collection, in an age in which the
expanding numbers of the clergy made it "increasingly difficult to monitor
shirking and malfeasance at the local level."2 84 Finally, indulgences enabled
price discrimination, with the Church issuing a variety of differential pricing
systems depending on the wealth of the person seeking the indulgence.285
Marriage. Marriage was another product innovation that created
opportunities for rent-seeking behavior. 8 Ekelund and his colleagues
write that "over time the Church successfully captured the marriage market

Cf EKELUND, HEBERT, & TOLLISON, MARKETPLACE, supra note 17, at 34
278.
(describing the finding of Arruijada, supra note 272, that "increases in the frequency of
confession are positively correlated with increases in cash giving and in-kind service").
279. See generally EKELUND ET AL., SACRED TRUST, supra note 203, at 152-61;
Ekelund, Hebert, & Tollison, supra note 255, at 316-17; EKELUND, HEBERT, & TOLLISON,
MARKETPLACE, supra note 17, at 116-18.
280. EKELUND ET AL., SACRED TRUST, supra note 203, at 154.
281.
Id. at 155.
282. Id. at 153, 157.
283. Id. at 158.
284. Id. at 70.
285. Id. at 161-62; see also EKELUND, HEBERT, & TOLLISON, MARKETPLACE, supra
note 17, at 115-17.
286. EKELUND, HEBERT, & TOLLISON, MARKETPLACE, supra note 17 at 118; see also
EKELUND ET AL., SACRED TRUST, supra note 203, ch. 5.
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by implementing a twofold strategy. First, it linked regulatory compliance
with eternal salvation; second, it varied its interpretations of what
constituted a 'valid' marriage in accord with certain objectives."287 On
the first point, by tying marriage to salvation the Church was gradually able
to take over most of the marriage market, which previously had allowed
a substantial number of secular marriages,2 88 and thus to expand the sphere
of its influence and authority.289
Second, by entering and ultimately capturing the market, the Church
found a new revenue source in marriage fees, a kind of excise tax that
was more manageable at the time given the difficulties involved in
collecting head taxes. 290 And that income source was highly amenable
to manipulation and rent-seeking. Incest laws, for instance, "varied
widely over the early medieval period," 291 expanding from a prohibition
on marriage between first cousins to a prohibition extending to sixth
cousins. "This served not only to increase Church control over the
matrimonial process, but it also provided ample opportunity for rent
extraction through dispensations and exemptions. 292
The possibility of expanding, contracting, or granting exemptions
from strict entry barriers for marriage within the Church had several
benefits for the Church. First, it allowed for the collection of fees for
exemptions from the marriage laws,293 including negotiations for large
gifts from the wealthy.294 Second, because litigation over marriage issues
was streamed into the Church's Consistory courts, it enhanced revenue

through litigation fees going to the Church. 295 Third, in addition to price
discrimination in the enforcement of (or exemption from) marriage laws
based on the wealth of the individual, it also allowed for price
discrimination between countries.296 Finally, by exerting some measure

287. EKELUND ET AL., SACRED TRUST, supra note 203, at 85.
288. See id. at 87-88.
289. See id. at 85.
290. See id. at 89-90.
291.
Id. at 91.
292. Id.
293.
See id. at 95-96, including a table showing fees for church exemptions for
consanguineous marriages.
294. See, e.g., id. at 98 (discussing the marriage of William, Duke of Normandy to
a distant cousin and his negotiations with the Church for permission to do so, which
ultimately resulted in the construction by William and his cousin of major church buildings).
295. See id. at 89-90, 99-100.
296. See id. at 104-05.
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of control over what constituted a valid marriage and who could or
couldn't inherit as the issue of a valid marriage, the Church was able to
"effectively limit[ ] dynastic development that could have rivaled the
power of the Church."297
Reformation and Counter-Reformation. Most of the issues discussed
above involved actions that enhanced the Church's control and authority
and made possible a good deal of revenue enhancement and rentseeking. These all took place within a monopoly environment. The more
powerful the monopoly and the more revenue the Church collected,
however, the more likely it was that competition would emerge, and at
some point might overcome the Church's efforts to suppress it through
excommunication and other means of control. As Ekelund, Hebert, and
Tollison argue, "[I]f [a] religious monopoly overcharges, it risks two
forms of entry: (1) the common citizenry may choose other dispensers of
religious services; and (2) the civil authorities may seek a different
provider of local services."2 98
Economic analysis thus helps explain the rise of the Protestant
Reformation and the subsequent Catholic response, the CounterReformation.2 99 This is consistent with the conventional wisdom that the
rise of Protestantism came in substantial part as a "protest" against a
variety of expensive and allegedly corrupt Church practices, including
the market in indulgences.300 The result of that rent-seeking behavior,
unsurprisingly, was the rise of competition through the offer of lowercost options by other faiths.30' "Suddenly, vast numbers of Catholics,
including many of its priests and political patrons, were offered a variety
of alternative ways to obtain the precious product of salvation."30 2 Given
the desire of local rulers to capture the loyalty of their subjects and
enhance their own power and control as against that of the Church, there
were increasing incentives for secular rulers to support such movements. 3 0 3
The Church attempted to respond to this competition through what
became known as the Counter-Reformation, or what Ekelund, Hebert,
and Tollison describe romantically as an "incumbent-firm reaction to

297.

Id. at 97.

298.

EKELUND, HEBERT, & TOLLISON, MARKETPLACE, supra note 17, at 106-07.

299. See generally id., chs. 5, 6.
300. The "corruption" of the services involved was as important as the expense,
insofar as perceptions of priestly luxury and self-dealing would reduce the credence
value of the Church's products and lower the cost of competition by other churches and
church leaders, many of whom were ascetics.
301.
See, e.g., EKELUND, HEBERT, & TOLLISON, MARKETPLACE, supra note 17, at 119.
302.
Witham, supra note 10, at 85.
303.
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market entry [by competitors]."30 4 The Church took a number of
economically predictable actions in response to the Protestant
Reformation. On the retail price side, many of the reforms launched
by the Council of Trent "can readily be interpreted as attempts to lower
the price, or increase the quality, of church services."306 Because of the
possibility of "Tiebout-like competition," where "people 'vote with their
feet' in response to local economic policies," 307 Catholic competition
with Protestantism was fiercest "in contiguous areas where a Catholic
region abutted a Protestant one." 308 The Church also responded to
Protestant competition by taking measures to suppress its rivals or raise
their costs, through military actions such as the Thirty Years' War and
suppressive actions such as the Inquisition. 30 9 The Church took measures
to advertise its products and enhance their quality and credence-for
example, by renewing efforts to enforce the rule of priestly celibacy-in
order to spur consumer demand.310 It also made some efforts at Church
reform of the "wholesale" side of its operation.3 1 1 For various reasons of
institutional structure, however, including the closely held, "Romancentered, Italian-dominated, papal monopoly" of the era, the leaders of
which "were naturally eager to protect their [own] economic interests,"3 12
efforts at wholesale reform were largely ineffective.313
Some of the examples I have canvassed in the past few pages run
somewhat far afield from the issue of freedom of the church, at least at a
superficial level, while others are closely related to the kinds of doctrinal
issues and reforms that formed the core of the struggle over freedom of
the church, and that can be seen in chastened form in contemporary
debates over things like the ministerial exception. The economics of the
Reformation and Counter-Reformation, in particular, may seem to be
304.

EKELUND, HEBERT, & TOLLISON, MARKETPLACE, supra note 17, at 135.

305.
See id. ("We find that the Roman Catholic Church responded to rival entry in
a way predicted by economic theory.").
306. Id. at 140.
307. Id. at 139; see also Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory ofLocal Expenditures, 64
J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956).
308.

EKELUND, HEBERT, & TOLLISON, MARKETPLACE, supra note 17, at 143.

309. See id. at 143-48.
310. See id. at 148-49.
311.
See id. at 143-60. "Wholesale," here, "refer[s] to the structure of internal
transactions of the institutional church, such as dealings between bishops and lower
clergy." Id. at 135-36.
312. Id. at 155.
313.
See id. at 158, 160.
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interesting as a historical matter but something of a departure from our
core concerns. As the next section shows, however, even that broader
discussion is highly relevant to freedom of the church and its modern
doctrinal implications, for two reasons.
First, the existence of religious competition ultimately says a good
deal about whether and when "freedom of the church" will be the least
dangerous, the least susceptible to rent-seeking, and the most acceptable
option. Second, as we have seen, one factor in inter-religious competition
that may influence the conditions for and consequences of church
autonomy is the involvement of secular regulatory authorities, such as
the actions of secular powers throughout the religious wars and into the
Peace of Westphalia.3 It is to the regulatory question that I now turn.
D. Church Interactionwith Secular Regulatory Authorities:
Competition,Regulation, and the Shape of
(Institutional)ReligiousFreedom
Much of our discussion so far has focused on economic analysis of
religion and of churches-appropriately enough, for a Symposium on
freedom of the church. But the word "freedom" is important as well, and
it necessarily involves the regulatory environment in which freedom
does or does not exist. Accordingly, in this final descriptive section, we
turn from the church by itself to the relationship between church and
state.
Like churches and their leaders, states and their leaders are also interest
groups, capable of acting rationally in the service of self-interested
goals."' We routinely ask of any regulatory regime why, and under what
pressures, regulators and/or politicians would agree on some set of rules
or legislation. If we use economic tools in doing so, we call that public
choice theory: the economic study of political behavior.316 We can and
should ask the same thing about the regulatory regime of religious
liberty, including its application to freedom of the church and its legal
doctrinal offshoots. 1 In exploring that subject in this section, I draw
314.
See, e.g., id. at 144.
315.
Like churches, of course, politicians may have a host of principled or publicregarding reasons for acting. As with my analysis of the economics of religion, the
analysis of church-state relations that follows continues to emphasize "interests" over
"ideas." GILL, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 10, at 27; see also id. at 57.
316.
See, e.g., JAMES M. BUCHANAN, POLITICS WITHOUT ROMANCE: A SKETCH OF
POSITIVE PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY AND ITS NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS, in 2 THE THEORY
OF PUBLIC CHOICE 11, 13 (James M. Buchanan & Robert D. Tollison eds., 1984).
317.
For examples in legal scholarship-again, relatively few of them, not all of
which are entirely on point-see, e.g., Hylton, supra note 11; Robinson, supra note 11;
Jill I. Goldenziel, Sanctioning Faith: Religion, State, and U.S.-Cuban Relations, 25 J.L.

114

[VOL. 21: 59, 2013]

Freedom of the Church Without Romance
JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY LEGAL ISSUES

heavily on the work of the political scientist Anthony Gill, whose recent
book, The Political Origins of Religious Liberty, is a useful and
provocative guide to the subject."'
Gill's basic object is to "frame[ ] religious freedom as a regulatory issue"
and "propose[ ] an economically rooted explanation for why politicians
would [regulate or] deregulate the religious marketplace.""' His starting
assumption is that "interests" play a critical role in "securing legislation
aimed at unburdening religious groups from onerous state regulations,"
or in securing legislation that imposes rather than relieves burdens on
religious practice.320 Proceeding from a set of fairly non-controversial
axioms, Gill derives a set of propositions about the interests and motivations
of both political and religious actors. 32 1 The interaction between them
results in a set of predictions about the likely state of religious regulation
or deregulation in particular political environments.
On one side of the ledger, political leaders considering whether to
regulate or deregulate religious groups and practices 32 2 will take three
primary factors into account: "their own political survival (i.e., ability to
get reelected or stave off a coup), the need to raise government revenue,

& PoL. 179 (2009); Bruce Yandle et al., Bootleggers, Baptists & Televangelists:
Regulating Tobacco by Litigation, 2008 U. ILL. L. REv. 1225; Christopher L. Eisgruber,
Secularization, Religiosity, and the United States Constitution, 13 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 445 (2006); Baradaran-Robison, supra note 11.
318.
See generally GILL, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 10; see also note 15,
supra (citing other works by Gill). Portions of STARK & FINKE, ACTS OF FAITH, supra
note 95, and FINKE & STARK, CHURCHING OF AMERICA, supra note 182, are also highly

useful to this discussion-especially the latter, which offers data and analysis on how
religious competition played out in the relatively unregulated American religious marketplace.
319. Gill, Religion and Civil Liberties,supra note 15, at 276.
320.

GILL, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 10, at 7.

321.
See id. at 231-33.
322. Regulation may be direct or indirect; that is, it may involve generally
applicable regulations that incidentally burden religious conduct, or it may involve
regulations that are aimed at religious conduct. See id. at 9-18. Thus, the analysis here
mostly elides the standard doctrinal difference between the two, see, e.g., Employment
Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990); Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of
Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993). To be sure, each form of law raises not only doctrinal
questions of its own, but also questions of political economy. See Paul Horwitz,
Rethinking the Law, Not Abandoning it: A Comment on "OverlappingJurisdictions",4
FAULKNER L. REv. 351, 359-61 (2013) (discussing the ways in which the requirement
that a law affecting religion be non-discriminatory increases the political costs of such
legislation, by creating larger affected constituencies and incentivizing them to cooperate
to defeat the law).
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and the ability to grow the economy."32 3 They also prefer to minimize
both civil unrest and the costs of ruling.324 The latter two goals can be
achieved in several ways, but the optimal method is to seek the "ideological
compliance of the population."3 25 At least where the dominant faith or
faiths are likely to support the government's goals and to counsel obedience
to the state and civil peace, the politician will have an incentive to
cooperate with the church.326
Of course, "churches are not only a source of ideological legitimation
[for the rulers] but also can represent a source of rival authority."32 7
Leaders facing churches as potential policy opponents and competitors
for popular affection will have some incentive to reduce those churches'
religious liberty. Or, as Hume recognized,328 they might choose instead
to "co-opt[ ] the support of a religious group with preferential legislation
that directly benefits the church in question or restricts the activities of
competitive denominations."329 The relative bargaining power of political
leaders with religious groups will vary depending on several factors,
including the existence and strength of political rivals, the level of religious
homogeneity or pluralism, and the degree to which any one faith "commands
hegemonic loyalty among the population." 330
On the other side, a religious group's incentives depend on a similar
set of circumstances.3 3 1 Many churches "are market-share maximizers;
they seek to spread their brand of spiritual message to as many followers
as possible." 332 Any or all of them may maintain a rhetorical commitment to
freedom of conscience regardless of one's faith;333 indeed, those faiths
and faith leaders may sincerely believe in freedom of conscience. In
practice, however, their approach to laws affecting religion may differ
depending on their position within the religious marketplace. Gill's
propositions on this point are simple, clear, and plausible:

323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
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GILL, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 10, at 9; see also id. at 47-48.

See id. at 47.
Id. at 49.
See id. at 49-50.
Id. at 51.
See Hume, supra note 168.
GILL, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 10, at 51.

Id. at 53.
See id. at 8, 44-47.
Id. at 44.
See id.
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Hegemonic religions will prefer high levels of government regulation (i.e.,
restrictions on religious liberty) over religious minorities. Religious minorities
will prefer laws favoring greater religious liberty. . . . In an environment where
no single religion commands a majority market share, the preferences of each
334
denomination will tend toward religious liberty.

These propositions require little explanation. But two points deserve
some further gloss. First, the goal of a relatively hegemonic religion is
not necessarily to suppress other sects for its own sake, or because it
believes those faiths to be perniciously false. Rather, its goal will be to
reduce religious competition.

Second, the kind of regulation of minority faiths favored by the
majority faith may not be the simple suppression of the minority's practices
or organization. Quite commonly, it will consist of efforts to raise the
costs of practice for that faith-for example, by supporting the passage
of generally applicable laws that raise costs for minority faiths but,
because its practices are consistent with the law, are costless for the
majority faith 33 --or to raise entry barriers for faiths that are new to that
political jurisdiction. For example, the majority faith may "seek laws that
require minority religions to gain the government's official permission to
proselytize, restrict visas on foreign missionaries, impose zoning and ...
media restrictions on alternative faiths, and so on.""' Or it might support
laws that strongly protect the freedom of religious groups, but favor the
imposition of strict standards before a group qualifies for legal recognition
as a church-standards that the majority faith will naturally meet. 37
Gill acknowledges the breadth of some of his propositions, and that
this breadth is a potential weakness.338 Given enough propositions and
enough possible tradeoffs, his theory can conveniently explain everything,
334. Id. at 45, 46.
335. An example might be a majority faith in a jurisdiction that practices abstention
from alcohol and does not use alcohol in its religious practices, and thus happily supports
that jurisdiction's prohibition on the sale of liquor. Or a majority religion that believes in
the use of conventional medical care might support laws that ban "alternative" medical
treatments or limit the ability to refuse conventional medical care, whether the
unconventional treatments or refusals to accept conventional medical treatment are
religiously motivated or not.
336.

GILL, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 10, at 44.

337.
See id. at 14 (citing the Czech Republic's law defining the standards for the
legal recognition of churches).
338.
See id. at 53. Although his acknowledgment focuses on only one of the
propositions about the political economy of religious liberty that he offers, I doubt he
would quarrel that this criticism is likely to be made of any of his propositions.
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and thus nothing.339 This is, of course, a familiar criticism of economic
explanations of human conduct, 340 one that economists themselves
recognize. 34 1 But he argues that the breadth of his approach is a strength
as well as a weakness, allowing it to shed light on the conditions of
religious liberty in "a wide array of political settings, both longitudinal
and latitudinal."34 2
Based on his evidence, as well as the examples discussed throughout
this Part and elsewhere in the economics of religion literature,343 I agree.
Among other things, such an approach may offer a useful corrective to
approaches that take seriously-perhaps too seriously-a set of purely
intellectual positions taken by politicians, religious groups and their
leaders, and intellectuals themselves about religious liberty. This approach
reminds us that interests matter as well as ideals, and that "when competing
ideas [about religious liberty] exist in society, it is often political interests
that tip the balance of the debate in one direction or another."3 4 4 An
interest-based approach also arms us to evaluate the policy tradeoffs
involved in different religious liberty regimes in different regions,
depending on the degree of religious homogeneity or heterogeneity that
exists in that area345 and the extent of competition that the dominant
church or churches face from new religious entrants.346

339.
Cf Ronald J. Allen & Brian Leiter, NaturalizedEpistemology and the Law of
Evidence, 87 VA. L. REv. 1491, 1527 (2001) ("Typically an argument or approach is
less, not more, valuable if more aspects of different problems can be defended or
explained with it. At the limit, an argument that explains everything explains nothing.
This is the root of the common complaint that law and economics work tends toward
being ad hoc[.]").
340. See generally Jeanne L. Schroeder, Just So Stories: PosnerianMethodology,
22 CARDOZO L. REv. 351 (2001).
341.
See, e.g., Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics' Perfect Rationality
Should Not Be Traded for Behavioral Law and Economics' Equal Incompetence, 91
GEO. L.J. 67, 69 n.3 (2002) (collecting examples).
342.

GILL, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 10, at 53; see also id. ("The specific

nature of the policies and policy trade-offs will largely be determined by the historical
context.").
343.
344.

See FINKE & STARK, CHURCHING OF AMERICA, supranote 182.
GILL, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 10, at 8 (emphasis omitted).

345. See, e.g., Paul Horwitz, Of Football, "Footnote One," and the CounterJurisdictionalEstablishment Clause: The Story of Santa Fe Independent School District
v. Doe, in FIRST AMENDMENT STORIES 481, 500-10 (Richard W. Garnett & Andrew

Koppelman eds., 2011) (discussing the problems of religious establishment and coercion
in overwhelmingly religious homogeneous locales); Paul Horwitz, Demographics and
Distrust: The Eleventh Circuit on GraduationPrayerin Adler v. Duval County, 63 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 835, 881-92 (2009) (same).
346. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520
(1993).
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Gill marshals a great deal of historical and contemporary evidence
suggesting that his model of the political conditions that enhance or
impede religious liberty has genuine explanatory power across a range of
geographical regions and political conditions. Both the evidence and its
consistency with his model are relevant to the question of freedom of the
church in several respects. They neither support nor refute the broader
arguments for freedom of the church,34 7 although they may undermine
arguments for (or against) freedom of the church that depend too much
on theoretical exercises or romanticized versions of past or current events.
But they do raise questions, and offer valuable suggestions, about the
conditions in which freedom of the church is likely to be more or less
viable-and more or less dangerous.
In broad terms, one may draw the following lessons from Gill's account.
(1) Regardless of its broader principles, whether and how a religious
entity asserts "freedom of the church" is likely to depend on whether it
constitutes a religious majority or a religious minority in a particular
region. (2) Again regardless of its broader principles, whether a church
views institutional autonomy and religious freedom as goods that ought
to apply to all faiths, or seeks to insulate itself from regulation while
disadvantaging other faiths, is also likely to depend on its majority or
minority status, as well as the nature of the competition it faces from
other faiths. (3) Accordingly, religious institutional autonomy, and religious
freedom in general, are more likely to flourish, and less likely to be

347. To be clear, I believe the economic account offered in this Part does offer
some arguments for freedom of the church or religious institutional autonomy, or legal
doctrines consistent with it, such as the ministerial exception. In particular, if religion is
a credence good whose viability depends on a church's ability to certify the quality of its
representatives and signal the degree of their commitment to its doctrines, then churches
have excellent reasons to resist the imposition of generally applicable employment laws.
To the extent that the broader society believes that religion is a positive good, see, e.g.,
ANDREw KOPPELMAN, DEFENDING AMERICAN RELIGIOUS NEUTRALYTY 2 (2012), that
religious organizations enhance social welfare (by, for example, caring for the poor and
sick), and that the law should therefore not push churches down a mainstreaming path
that may lead to their decline, see generally FINKE & STARK, CHURCHING OF AMERICA,
supra note 182, then society will have reasons to favor such doctrines as well.
Arguments that the ministerial exception "mistakenly protect[s] religious institutions'
religious freedom at the expense of their religious employees" may lack a full
appreciation of the effects on churches of laws that undermine their credence value.
Griffin, Sins of Hosanna-Tabor, supra note 5, at 4. They fail to weigh properly the costs
of imposing employment discrimination laws on churches, which might serve religious
employees in the short run but weaken or kill the churches in the long run.
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accompanied by disturbing side-effects, under conditions of genuine
religious pluralism and some form of non-establishment. Let me illustrate
these conclusions using Gill's evidence, again taking the Catholic Church as
the primary example.
As we saw in Part II, in DignitatisHumanae the Church took a broad
view of the importance of religious freedom for all persons and faiths,
and made clear that religious freedom involves freedom of the church as
well as individual freedom.34 8 It did not make strong statements about
religious establishment, and suggested on the whole that some form of
establishment would be permissible. But it added that even under conditions
in which "special civil recognition is given to one religious community
in the constitutional order of society," "the right of all citizens and religious
communities to religious freedom should be recognized and made
effective in practice," and made clear that all citizens should be entitled
to "equality . .. before the law."3 4 9
This language, assertive of universal principles, suggests that the
Church's position on religious freedom would apply equally everywhere.
Conversely, a more interest-based approach to questions of religious
freedom "would lead us to expect variations in Catholic policy positions
as determined by the Church's market position" in particular countries.35o
The evidence Gill amasses points more strongly to the latter position.3 5 1 It
suggests that, both before and after DignitatisHumanae, the Church has
sought to "cut[ ] the best deal it [can], country by country."352 In each
case, the contours of its position are substantially determined by its majority
or minority status, and by the nature of the competition it faces in the
local religious marketplace.
348. See supra notes 143-62 and accompanying text.
349. DH, supra note 2, § 6.
350. Gill, Religious Liberty, supra note 10, at 45.
351.
Russell Hittinger makes a similar point about pre-Vatican II Church relations
with various states, arguing that between 1789 and the promulgation of DignitatisHumanae
"the Church was equipped on the one hand with philosophical and theological doctrines
on the relationship between Church and the states (in the abstract), and on the other with
an ad hoc diplomatic policy realized via concordats," but "lacked a middle-level policy
bringing together the speculative and diplomatic poles." Hittinger, supra note 155, at
1037; see also id. at 1056 ("[A]fter 1789, the Church attempted to protect its liberties by
cutting the best deal it could, country by country."). Hittinger argues that Dignitatis
Humanae "attempts to supply what had been missing for two centuries, namely a 'middle
level' position that unifies principle and policy," while cautioning that the document "is
not a complete exercise in either the theory or the practice of Church-state relations." Id.
at 1039. Gill's work confirms Hittinger's broad point about pre-Vatican II practice, and
places it in a useful framework of political interests. But his research also suggests that a
good deal of inconsistency remains between principle and practice, and that it can be
explained from the interest-based, rational choice perspective that Gill offers.
352. Id. at 1056.
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Two regions recently emerging from relative political and religious
stasis provide strong evidence on this point: Latin America and the former
Soviet states. Catholicism long enjoyed a dominant position in Latin
America. That position involved a mix of costs and benefits. It enjoyed
privileged status and financial aid on the one hand. On the other, it
accepted strict state-imposed limits on its behavior, centuries after the
Investiture Controversy, such as monarchical rights of approval of clerics in
the colonies, control over excommunication, and royal "veto power over
papal bulls." 35 3 During this period, the Church "struggled to gain more
independence from state control, seeking its own preferred regulatory
regime that enhanced its institutional autonomy-freedom of religion for
Catholicism-while protecting its social position by limiting the freedom of
non-Catholics."35 4
With the rise of independent Latin American states, the Church was
left to negotiate arrangements piecemeal, depending on the political
circumstances that applied in each country. For the most part, it was able
to retain its privileged status, both because of its monopoly position and
because secular leaders saw political advantages in religious uniformity. 35
It also used the changes in political power to seek to renegotiate its
deals, attempting to "retain exclusive dominion over the region while
simultaneously securing institutional autonomy," without losing access
to continued state financial support.35 6 At the same time, these states
gradually muscled in on the Church's resources and revenue streams,
expropriating Church lands and assets and taking over profitable social
functions such as marriage and funeral services and birth and death
registries. 357
353.
GILL, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 10, at 119; see generally id. at 114-21.
354. Id. at 115.
355. See id. at 123-24. Gill quotes Juan Egafia, a nineteenth century Chilean politician,
as saying that "[r]eligious uniformity is the most effective means of consolidating the
tranquility of the great mass of the nation." Id at 124 (citation omitted) (emphasis
omitted).
356. Id. at 125. See also id. at 125-26, discussing the work of Rafael Lasso de la
Vega, the Bishop of Mrida in nineteenth century Venezuela ("'The primary concern of
the Bishop . . . was to secure the recognition by the state that the exercise of the
patronage should belong to the church. By opposing a "religion of state," he hoped to
bring about the abolition of state control over the Catholic church, not to establish liberty
of worship. He expected the state to uphold the exclusiveness of the Catholic church
without exercising any tuition over it.") (quoting MARY WATrERS, A HISTORY OF THE
CHURCH IN VENEZUELA, 1810-1930 83-84 (1933)).
See id at 128-32.
357.
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Nevertheless, the Church maintained a strong position in many states
well into the twentieth century," with obvious glaring exceptions such
as Mexico.3 9 Where it could, the Church cooperated with despotic regimes
to maintain its privileges and state subsidies while seeking to deny
similar privileges to competing Protestant faiths, as it did in Peronist
Argentina. 36 0 As Protestant competition grew, its efforts to restrain that
competition grew apace, including efforts to restrict entry by foreign
missionaries, deny broadcast licenses to Protestant churches and limit
public assembly, and restrict property ownership by those churches.36'
As Gill argues elsewhere, political conditions and the degree of Protestant
competition also dictated local Church policies on fundamental issues of
human rights. Where competition was light, the Church was more likely
to support despotic regimes; where it was heavy, the Church in that country
was more likely to "take up a preferential option for the poor and, as a
means of winning back credibility among the poor, to oppose military
dictatorships."362
The balance of political and religious power has changed in much of
Latin America in the modem era. Both political liberalization and the
rise of the Protestant population worked together to create more open
and egalitarian religious liberty regimes. 36 3 The liberalization and
universalization of religious liberty in Latin America coincided with the
advent of post-Vatican II Catholic policies on religious liberty, although
the discussion below of events in the former Soviet states suggests that
this point should not be overstated. At the same time, and despite the
universal statement that Dignitatis Humanae represents, local branches

358.
See id at 133.
359.
For a discussion of conditions in Mexico, see id. at 146-65.
360. See id. at 134. As Gill notes, the Church ultimately opposed Per6n and
supported the military coup that toppled him. (Perhaps coincidentally, in the final years
of his regime Per6n had been more inclined to take action against the Church.) The military
junta that replaced him returned the favor by rigorously restricting the actions of
competing Protestant groups. Ultimately, the close association between local Church
officers and the anti-Peronist forces would damage the Church's standing in Argentina.
See id. at 134, 139.
361.
See id. at 139. In Colombia, "For the Catholic bishops' part in helping to bring
about a political truce between the Liberal and Conservative parties, the military
government that took power in 1953 negotiated a concordat with the Vatican that
effectively made Protestantism illegal in 75 percent of the nation's territory." Id. at 140.
362.
Id. at 141 n.41 (summarizing Gill, supra note 15). As Gill notes, the fall of
liberation theology, although it surely had an ideational component, was also consistent
with a broader trend that should be familiar to readers of this Article: the Vatican's move
to centralize its doctrines and operations and "bring[ ] the international Church under
greater hierarchical control." Id. at 161.
363.
See id. at 140-45.
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of the Church have not always behaved accordingly. 3 In Argentina, the
Church "encouraged politicians to enact tough restrictions on non-Catholic
religions including onerous registration requirements that would make it
nearly impossible for new and smaller evangelical groups to gain official
status." 365 Protestants are still harassed in parts of Argentina, Chile, and
Colombia, and "the willingness of public officials to respond is largely
determined by the strength of the Catholic clergy." 366
Gill concludes that "[t]he trajectory is in the right direction."36 7 But it
seems unlikely that changes in the Church's own views on religious liberty
are entitled to all the credit. Rather, it has more to do with changes in
the Church's competitive position and the rise in political liberalization in
those countries, which gives the growing Protestant population more
bargaining power and encourages all sides to share in the resulting growth
in religious freedom. As Gill writes, "[R]eligious pluralism begets religious
freedom, which in turn enhances the prospects for greater pluralism." 368
Recent events in the Russian and Baltic states follow something of the
same trajectory, but with far less liberalization and a far more toxic
combination of demographics and political interests. One difference, of
course, is that the Catholic Church has been a minority faith in most of
the region, and has acted accordingly. The majority church, the Russian
Orthodox Church, has acted in ways that confirm, as if there were any
doubt, that entrenchment of majority status and efforts to suppress religious
competition are hardly uniquely Catholic behaviors. 369 But where the
364. See also STARK & FINKE, ACTS OF FAITH, supra note 95, at 179 (noting strong
resistance to Vatican II by the local Catholic hierarchy in Spain and Portugal, and
observing that "[t]he insulation of the national church in both nations was greatly
facilitated by authoritarian governments with profound commitments to traditional
Catholic piety and power to veto all appointments to bishop").
365.
GILL, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 10, at 142 (citing Matthew Marostica,
Religion and Global Affairs: Religious Activism and Democracy in Latin America, 18
SAIS REv. 44, 48 (1998)).
366. Id. at 145 n.49.
Id. at 145.
367.
368. Id. at 47; see also Mark Chaves & David E. Cann, Regulation, Pluralism,and
Religious Market Structure, 4 RATIONALITY & Soc'Y 272, 288 (1990) (agreeing that the
evidence suggests that "state subsidies and state regulation of religion clearly dampen the
level of religious participation in a society," but adding that additional sociological
factors must also be considered).
369. The Russian Orthodox Church's behavior, during and after the Soviet years
and well into the present, also confirms another proposition that has been plain since
well before Adam Smith: majority churches that seek to survive by collaborating with
and accommodating themselves to the ruling regime risk corruption in the process.
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Catholic Church does enjoy majority status in parts of this region, it has
mirrored that behavior, several decades after Vatican II.
Thus, in those regions where the Russian Orthodox Church formed the
dominant faith, it sought to entrench itself, both by seeking exclusive
financial support from the state and by attempting to suppress competition
from other faiths, including evangelical Protestants and Muslims, largely
by banning the operations of purportedly "foreign" religious organizations. 7 0
As a minority faith in Russia, the Catholic Church lobbied for greater
religious liberty, but also pursued a second-best strategy of seeking
recognition under existing law as a privileged "historic faith," which would
have protected the Church while still imposing restrictions on Protestant
minorities.37 In a somewhat more pluralistic state, Latvia, the situation
is different. There, six faiths, including Catholicism, are given some benefits
and are not required to register with the state, while smaller faiths are
subject to greater restrictions.372
In Lithuania, where Catholicism is a majority faith, its strategy has
been different. While the nation was an early leader in seeking new legal
guarantees of religious liberty, and a Catholic official was involved in
those efforts,373 other "influential Catholics" in the country argued that
the law ought to restrict the religious liberties of "unknown religious
movements" as opposed to older and more established faiths.374 By the
time the religious freedom law passed in 1995, it "had been modified so
many times as to render it unrecognizable." 7 It establishes several
"historical churches" with special privileges, among which "the Roman
Catholic Church stands out as being the one confession that is more
equal among equals." 376 Its special status is confirmed and reinforced by
a concordat signed between the Lithuanian parliament and the Vatican in
2000 that effectively grants the Church a local franchise in rendering a
number of social services. 377 The treatment of non-established churches
in Lithuania has mostly been good, without the suppression of competition
that has been observed elsewhere, although a law passed in 2006 made

370. See, e.g., GILL, RELIGIOUs LIBERTY, supra note 10, at 208-09.
371.
See id. at 210 & n.42.
372. See id. at 217-18. Interestingly for entrenchment and anti-competitive purposes,
"[t]he law also stipulates that no splinter group (a second group within the same confession)
may register." Id. at 217.
373.
See id. at 219.
374. Id. at 220.
375. Id.
376. Id.
377.
See id.

124

[VOL. 21: 59, 2013]

Freedom of the Church Without Romance
JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY LEGAL ISSUES

real estate assets held by those churches taxable, as compared to the taxexempt properties held by traditional churches. 378
E. Conclusion
The discussion in this part has ranged widely, and sometimes seemingly
far afield of the core subject of freedom of the church, narrowly understood.
As Part I of this Article shows, however, "freedom of the church" has
never been confined to a simple rule of institutional autonomy or noninterference with central church functions. From Gelasius to Gregory
VII to the present day, it has always been part of a suite of complex and
interrelated issues, including doctrinal reform, the entrenchment of
centralized power within the church itself, questions about the nature
and scope of both institutional and individual religious liberty, and the
balance of power, competition, and cooperation between church and
state. Whether one supports or opposes the general concept of freedom
of the church, one can hardly do it justice without a comprehensive and
fairly unromantic look at all of these issues. 379 To do that, we need a
decent set of tools and enough clinical distance to use them properly.
History provides such a tool. As this Part has shown, so does economics.
What this Part and its focus on the economics of religion suggests is
that a purely principled, intellectual, or even intellectual-historical approach
to freedom of the church, and religious freedom more generally, is
insufficient. Interests and incentives matter too, whether for individuals
or institutions and regardless of whether those institutions are religious
or not. Individuals make choices about religious commitment for a

378. See id. at 221-22.
379. As Frederick Gedicks rightly remarks in his contribution to this Symposium,
we might still understand freedom of the church, and the events that led to it, as a
powerful and useful "myth." See generally Frederick Mark Gedicks, supra note 21. I
have taken a similar position about the role of history in American constitutional law.
See Paul Horwitz, The Past, Tense: The History of Crisis-andthe Crisis of History-in
Constitutional Theory, 62 ALB. L. REv. 459 (1997). But myths have their limits. Even if
they need not be strictly true, their power depends in part on achieving a sufficient
degree of accuracy. The more inaccurate a myth proves to be, the more likely it is that it
will leave embittered and cynical critics and apostates in its wake. Moreover, myths
operate at a general level, and rarely answer specific questions; for that, one needs more.
Finally, as this Part's discussion of the inconsistency between Dignitatis Humanae and
the Church's actions on the ground suggests, those who invoke a powerful but simple
myth will ultimately suffer a loss of credibility when the slippage between myth and
reality becomes obvious. See id. at 508-09.
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variety of reasons, not least the obvious spiritual ones. But they are not
immune from considerations of cost and benefit. Churches want to
survive and thrive in a world of scarce resources, and act accordingly.
Churches, as institutional actors, are aware of and interact with external
forces, including both religious competitors and regulatory regimesoften according to principle, but sometimes inconsistently and rarely
without any consideration of their own interests. As I conclude in the
final Part, a full consideration of those motives, incentives, and interests,
and a decent appreciation for how they have played out in the past and
present, can tell us something about the value and dangers of freedom of
the church, and about the circumstances in which it is likely to do the
most good and the least harm.
IV. SOME TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS ABOUT FREEDOM OF THE
CHURCH, ESPECIALLY IN THE CONTEMPORARY
UNITED STATES

The historical and economic accounts that I have offered in this
Article lead to similar conclusions about freedom of the church. They do
not tell us in strong terms whether we should favor "freedom of the
church" or oppose it. But they do tell us some important things. They
suggest something about the chastened nature of freedom of the church
in the modem era. They tell us something about the legal, political, and
demographic conditions under which we might be more or less concerned
about invocations of "freedom of the church." Finally, albeit more
tentatively still, they may tell us something about why claims for church
autonomy have recently been advanced so vocally in the United States.
First, whatever "freedom of the church" means today, it is certainly a
greatly reduced and chastened phenomenon. Neither churches, nor the
concept of freedom of the church itself, are immune from the disenchantment,
rationalization, and bureaucratization of law and society. 38 0 The kinds of
things that a legal claim of "freedom of the church" or church autonomy
cover in our present environment are a far cry from the kinds of claims
that would once have been viewed as central to freedom of the church.

380.

See generally MAX WEBER, SCIENCE AS A VOCATION, in SOCIOLOGICAL

WRITINGS 276 (Wolf Heyerbrand ed., Hans A. Gerth & C. Wright Mills trans., 1994)
(1919). For a useful recent discussion, see Yishai Blank, The Reenchantment of Law, 96
CORNELL L. REv. 633, 635-38 (2011). Religious institutions, too, can be modem
bureaucracies, as Weber noted. See, e.g., 2 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN
OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY 220-21 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds.,

Ephraim Fischoff et al. trans., Bedminster Press 1968) (1956). See also George H.
Taylor, Race, Religion, and Law: The Tension Between Spirit and its Institutionalization,
6 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 51, 59-62 (2006).
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That might be less true in a more homogenous religious and political
environment; but it is very true in an environment of religious and
political pluralism like ours.38
Claims of freedom of the church and its concomitant legal consequences
in the modem United States thus hardly resemble the Gregorian goal of
"[bringing] the world unreservedly into the sphere of the Church." 38 2
Freedom of the church, in America at least, is now much closer to a simple
claim to be left alone. Even that is overstated. Churches invoking
institutional autonomy in the United States in fact seek only a limited degree
of immunity from law's operation, while accepting and even welcoming
it in many areas. They do not demand the reinstatement of benefit of
the clergy, or treatment as full and equal sovereigns; rather, they ask-in
court3 and in regulatory filings with government agencies 3 85-for
exemptions from employment or insurance laws.
In short, whatever it may once have represented, freedom of church is
now both dualist in nature and diminished in scope. Sweeping assertions
by opponents of one of the doctrinal offshoots of freedom of the church,
the ministerial exception, that churches here are demanding the right "to
become a law unto themselves" are vastly overstated, by any reasonable
standard.386 So too, however, are any attempts by the most ardent defenders
of freedom of the church to draw too direct a line between Canossa and
today. Today's version of "freedom of the church" may be a descendant
381.
I thus agree with Richard Schragger and Micah Schwartzman, who argue in
their contribution to this Symposium that "freedom of the church must be
reformulated-or translated-to account for the pluralism and fragmentation of religion
in modem democratic states." Richard C. Schragger & Micah Schwartzman, Lost in
Translation: A Dilemma for Freedom of the Church, 21 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 15,
17 (2013). As they note, this point is widely acknowledged by champions of freedom of
the church. I do not, however, share their conclusion that "freedom of the church is an
idea whose time passed long ago." Id. at 17.
382.

TELLENBACH, supra note 39, at 154.

383. See, e.g., Reply Brief for Petitioner, Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran
Church & School v. EEOC, No. 10-553, 2011 WL 3919718, at *19-*22 (Sept. 1, 2011)
(discussing the "narrow category of cases" to which the ministerial exception applies and
readily acknowledging many areas of law that should and will continue to apply to
religious entities) [hereinafter Reply Brie].
384. See, e.g., id.
385. See, e.g., U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, General Counsel, Rulemaking,
available at http://www.usccb.org/about/general-counsel/rulemaking/ (collecting comments
filed with government on proposed regulations regarding the contraceptive mandate and
other issues).
386. Griffin, supra note 5, at 1842.
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of yesterday's version, but in roughly the same way that a chickadee is
descended from a dinosaur. "Freedom of the church" in the modem United
States is, in the end, simply not that big a deal, despite some of the
claims of defenders and critics of the concept alike.
The second point follows from the first. Somewhat counter-intuitively,
freedom of the church today is on a stronger footing precisely because it
has become so chastened and reduced. It is more justifiable because it is
so boxed in. In the United States, at least, assertions of freedom of the
church do not represent an existential threat to the modem legal and
political order or to the fundamentals of church-state relations. 8 In
practice, they are closer to a debate over the interpretation of the precise
terms of the relational contract between church and state. 8 To be sure,
that debate speaks to broader questions about our church-state settlement,
and about the nature of both the state and mediating institutions such as
the church.389 It is an important debate. But it takes place on very
different terms and with much lower stakes in modem America than it
did in medieval Europe.
Even in this environment, there are still good reasons to champion
some version of freedom of the church. The history canvassed in Part II
suggests that it is premature-indeed, that it may always be premature 390
to conclude that arguments for freedom of the church are just "religious
nostalgia," and that it has "almost nothing in common with our modem,
post-Enlightenment, democratic society."3 9 ' We are a long way from
the Middle Ages; but we are not that far from Bismarck's Kulturkampf
or the expulsion of the Carthusian monks from their motherhouse in

387. Conversely, it is a stretch to say that opposition to particular legal doctrines
instantiating some chastened version of freedom of the church, such as the ministerial
exception, threatens "a revolution in relations between church and state," Reply Brief supra
note 383, at *1, or that negotiations over the precise contours of the contraceptive mandate
represent a fundamental threat to American religious liberty. See, e.g., U.S. Conference of
Catholic Bishops, Ad Hoc Committee for Religious Liberty Our First, Most Cherished
Liberty: A Statement on Religious Liberty (Apr. 6, 2012), http://www.usccb.org/ issues-andaction/religious-liberty/upload/Our-First-Most-Cherished-Liberty-Aprl 2-6-12-12.pdf.
Cf Horwitz, supra note 322, at 362-66 (arguing that it is a mistake to treat
388.
advocates of the use of shari'a in the interpretation of Islamic marriage agreements in
American courts as seeking to abandon the law altogether).
389. See, e.g., Horwitz, Defending (Religious) Institutionalism, supra note 19, at
1051-53, 1062-63.
390. In this, I agree with Zhou Enlai, who reportedly said in 1973, when asked
about the effects of the French Revolution, that it was "too early to say." See, e.g., David
L. Faigman, The Daubert Revolution:and the Birth of Modernity: Managing Scientific
Evidence in the Age of Science, 46 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 893, 895 & n.4 (2013) (quoting
Enlai and noting questions about the accuracy of the statement).
391.
Schragger & Schwartzman, supra note 5, at 936, 938.
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democratic, post-Enlightenment, early twentieth century France.3 92 In
the modern era, in which the government can argue that the Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment supply "no basis" for a church's right to
control its relations with ministers, while grudgingly conceding that freedom
of association might shelter it from the operation of the employment
laws," freedom of the church is surely still relevant, even if it is less
essential.
Our study of the economics of religion in Part III also suggests that
some version of freedom of the church, or religious institutional
autonomy, still carries weight. If it suggests that churches are an interest
group, it also reminds us that they face competition from other interest
groups, who may engage in regulatory capture to the disadvantage of
religious groups.394 More broadly, it reminds us that one of the central
facts of the religious marketplace is the idea that religion is a credence
good. A primary field of competition between churches is the assurances
they provide of the quality of religious goods and the trustworthiness of
the seller. The legal regulation of fundamental questions involving such
matters as church hiring and firing is thus no minor matter. It goes directly
to the heart of a church's well-being-and possibly its survival. 3 "
The economics of religion literature also tells us something about the
optimal conditions for religious institutional autonomy: the conditions
under which it is least likely to result in the kinds of overweening claims
or social dangers that concern its opponents. Recall the core conclusion
of Anthony Gill's economic analysis of religious liberty: "[R]eligious
pluralism begets religious freedom, which in turn enhances the prospects
for greater pluralism."396 Remember Adam Smith's argument that "[t]he
interested and active zeal of religious teachers can be dangerous and
troublesome only where there is, either but one sect tolerated in the
society, or where the whole of a large society is divided into two or three
great sects." 397 And consider Roger Finke and Rodney Starke's conclusion,
392. See, e.g., Brennan, supra note 115, at 30-31.
393.
See Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 706 (emphasis added).
394. See, e.g., Jo Becker, The Other Power in the West Wing, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1,
2012, at Al (discussing the efforts of Valerie Jarrett, a powerful advisor to President
Obama, to resist church demands for broader exemptions from the contraceptive
mandate, in part because doing so "would pit the president against a crucial constituency,
women's groups, who saw the coverage as basic preventive care").
395.
See generally FINKE & STARK, CHURCHING OF AMERICA, supra note 182.
396. GILL, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 10, at 47.
397. Smith, supra note 165, at 851.
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after an extensive examination of American religious history, that the
rise of disestablishment and free exercise of religion, by encouraging a
competitive religious marketplace, contributed to "the churching of
America."098 Indeed, Catholicism itself flourished in the United States
precisely because it did not and could not achieve what Gregory VII
wanted for Europe. It was forced to become "an extremely effective and
competitive religious firm when forced to confront a free market religious
economy." 399
This suggests that arguments for freedom of the church or its correlates
are ultimately strengthened by a strong regime of non-establishment.
Non-establishment rules guard against a variety of potential risks to both
church and state that are posed by the possibility of regulatory capture of
government by a church (and vice versa)-risks that are evident in the
events of the Investiture Controversy itself. They provide important
safeguards against the kinds of efforts to suppress competition and
engage in rent-seeking that generally accompany religious homogeneity.
They strengthen the freedom of individual churches by encouraging and
facilitating competition, which in turn prevents political and regulatory
overreach by any one church. And, both through the competitive
mechanisms of the religious marketplace and by imposing limits on
government sponsorship of religion, they ward off the stultification and
co-optation that may result from religious monopoly or government
sponsorship. Some modem champions of freedom of the church have
argued that in theory, greater government endorsement of religion is
consistent with freedom of the church.4 0 0 From a practical perspective,
however, they would be wiser to think of strong non-establishment rules
as a positive good for freedom of the church.
Finally, and more speculatively, this Article offers some insight on
why freedom of the church has become an increasingly prominent part
of recent debates about religious freedom. With changes in Establishment
Clause doctrine allowing greater access to public funding for religious
institutions that provide social services, 401 and the corresponding rise in

398. FINKE & STARK, CHURCHING OF AMERICA, supra note 182, at 1, 3. But see
Daniel V.A. Olson, Religious Pluralism and US Church Membership: A Reassessment,
60 SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION 149 (1999) (critiquing Finke and Stark's argument).
399. Id. at 117. See also Rodney Stark, Do Catholic Societies Really Exist?, 4
RATIONALITY & Soc'Y 261 (1992) (arguing that the intensity of religious commitment
among Catholics is inversely correlated to their percentage of the population).
400. See, e.g., Smith, Freedom of the Church, supra note 1.
401.
See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002); Mitchell v. Helms,
530 U.S. 793 (2000).
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government support of faith-based services, 402 religious organizations
have become increasingly important competitors for public funding in
the social services arena. Social services have long been a primary avenue
by which churches provide goods to current or potential members. 4 03 At
the same time, churches are always at risk of being crowded out of this
part of the religious marketplace by the state itself, which now provides
many of the social services that used to be supplied by churches.40 4
Moreover, churches' acceptance of government support for the provision
of social services often comes with substantial regulatory strings attached,4 05
creating a tradeoff between the benefits they enjoy from funding and the
effects that conditional funding may have on their distinctive religious
product.406
Viewed in this light, it is worth considering whether the recent revival
of arguments for freedom of the church might represent a form of rentseeking by churches in response to contemporary financial and regulatory
conditions in the United States. When equal access by churches to
government funding of social services is combined with arguments for
institutional autonomy and/or regulatory exemptions or immunity, the
result is decidedly advantageous for churches. It allows churches to enhance
both their status and their revenue base by providing social services
while being paid by the state to do so. At the same time, it allows them
to assert immunity from any regulatory conditions connected to those
public funds. Similarly, in the case of privately funded social services
402. See, e.g., Stanley W. Carlson-Thies, Faith-BasedInitiative 2.0: The Bush
Faith-Basedand Community Initiative, 32 HARV. L.J. & PUB. POL'Y 931, 931-33, 936-37
(2009) (discussing the growth of such initiatives, dating back to the Clinton administration
and continuing through the present).
403.
See, e.g., Witham, supra note 10, at 189-90; FINKE & STARKE, CHURCHING OF
AMERICA, supra note 182, at 138-39, 155; EKELUND, HEBERT, & TOLLISON, MARKETPLACE,

supra note 17, at 30.
404. See, e.g., Hungerman, supra note 217, at 266 ("In some cases government
provision of goods and services (such as services for the poor) may substitute or 'crowd
out' the role of religious groups in local communities").
405. See, e.g., Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, The Faith-BasedInitiative and the
Constitution, 55 DEPAuL L. REv. 1 (2005); Thomas C. Berg, Vouchers and Religious
Schools: The New Constitutional Questions, 72 U. CIN. L. REv. 151 (2003); Martha
Minow, Public and Private Partnerships:Accountingfor the New Religion, 116 HARV.
L. REv. 1229 (2003).
406. Even with respect to privately funded social services provided by churches,
both their coffers and their consciences are likely to be burdened by the imposition of
new regulatory requirements, as the continuing debate over the contraceptive mandate
suggests.
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provided by churches, it gives them a competitive advantage over other
social services providers, by allowing them to avoid the costs involved in
providing full health insurance coverage or complying with employment
discrimination laws.
I doubt that this is the only reason, or even the primary reason, why
freedom of the church has become a hot topic of late. But the possibility
that it is a motivating factor ought to spur some reflection on the part of
its champions. They should at least think hard about just how far freedom
of the church should extend where funding with strings is involved.
That is a somewhat negative note on which to end the discussion.
I emphasize that I continue to believe that freedom of the church is an
important topic, and one that has much to recommend it. I believe its
critics treat it too harshly. But it certainly deserves a tougher, more cleareyed look from its friends.407

407. Cf MILLER'S CROSSING (20th Century Fox 1990) ("My chin's hanging out
right next to yours. I'd worry a lot less if I thought you were worrying enough.").
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